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Disruptions and Continuity in the Singaporean Chinese Community: Social Networks, Collaborationists, and the Black Market under the British and Japanese administrations, 1819-1960

Alison Fong

The year 1819 marked the beginning of modern Singapore when Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles of the British East India Company (BEIC) signed a treaty with the Sultan of Johor to establish a trading post on the island.¹ In the span of five years, the small island grew into a prosperous entrepot that was strategically positioned at the intersection of global trading networks and maritime routes. At a very early stage, the BEIC recognized the value and the utility of the Chinese migrant population to the economic growth and success of Singapore and to the peninsula.² The BEIC's free trade and open migration policy attracted droves of Chinese and Indian migrants to the region.³ From 1819 to 1931, the Chinese population increased exponentially across the peninsula, challenging – and in some areas, dwarfing – the indigenous Malay population. In 1824, for example, the population of Singapore was 10,683; 31% of that was Chinese and 60.2% was Malay. By 1931, however, the population increased to 557,745; 75.1% of that was Chinese and 11.7% was Malay.⁴ While many migrant laborers considered themselves “sojourners,” who worked overseas for a period before returning to their hometown with their newly gained riches, there were also many migrants who chose to permanently settle

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¹ Azlan Tajuddin, *Malaysia in the World Economy (1824-2011): Capitalism, Ethnic Divisions, and "Managed" Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012), 44.

² Stan Neal, "The Singapore Model," in *Singapore, Chinese Migration and the Making of the British Empire, 1819-67* (Woodbridge, UK: Boydell Press, 2019), 13-14.

³ H. Morse Stephens, "The Administrative History of the British Dependencies in the Further East," *The American Historical Review* 4, no. 2 (1899): 256, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1833555>.

⁴ Saw Swee-Hock, "Population Trends in Singapore, 1819-1967," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 10, no. 1 (1969): 41. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20067730>.

on the peninsula. These settlers dominated mercantile networks and industrial positions, which elevated their status and influence within their communities and the colonial administration.

This paper focuses on the Chinese community of Singapore and their experiences under the British colonial administration and the Japanese military administration from 1819 to 1960. I argue that the Chinese community utilized and transformed social networks formed during the British colonial era (1819-1942) to adapt to the upheavals that the Japanese Occupation of Singapore (1942-1945) and the return of the British administration (1945-1960) introduced. These social networks shifted to meet the needs of the Chinese community in response to changing social hierarchies and status quos. Some were based on traditional kinship systems, and others were based on mercantile and trading relations. The strength of these social networks as they persisted from the prewar era to the postwar era demonstrated a continuity that most historians overlooked.

Moreover, the disruptiveness of the Japanese Occupation changed the power structure of the Chinese community drastically, which allowed several agents to flourish as a new elite. Even after the return of the British in 1945, these structures of power continued into the postwar period, as the population attempted to recover from the Occupation. The agents at the center of these networks from the Occupation era to the postwar period were labeled as traitors, and their roles were diminished in postcolonial memorialization of the war. Contrary to their passive portrayal by historians, I attempt to return more agency and power to these agents through a deeper analysis of their interactions with the Japanese and British imperial powers within these social networks.

Studies on collaboration during the Japanese Occupation of Singapore are severely lacking, especially in the realm of Chinese wartime collaboration. This contrasts with European

studies on wartime collaboration, especially in Vichy France.⁵ In reconstructing motives of Chinese wartime collaborationists, historians like Yoji Akashi and Cheah Boon Kheng turn to Japanese policies and memoirs to show how they coerced Chinese community leaders to participate in Japanese-sponsored organizations. Furthermore, they argue that the ineffectiveness of these Japanese-sponsored Chinese organizations was a product of aggressive Japanese policies and that the Chinese leaders were nothing more than puppets of the Japanese imperial regime.⁶ By contrast, testimonies of wartime collaborationism feature more prominently in oral histories, which allow us to peer deeper into their motivations and strategies of collaborationism.⁷ However, there has yet to be any scholarship that moves beyond these oral histories to retrace an alternative narrative of Singapore's Chinese community during the Occupation and the postwar period.

The agents of these networks were classified into two lineage-based categories, the Straits-born Chinese and the China-born Chinese. Historians have significantly parsed the differences between the Straits-born and the China-born, presenting them as cultural and political opposites. These assumed impressions of the Straits-born and China-born often borrow from colonial perspectives of the two groups. One British observer praised how the Straits-born “grafted the latest benefits of Western science on to their more ancient civilization” and how they “return from British and American Universities imbued with tremendous zeal for uprooting

⁵ See: Stanley Hoffman, "Collaborationism in France during World War II," *The Journal of Modern History* 40, no. 3 (1968): 376, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1878146>.

⁶ See: Yoji Akashi, "Japanese Policy Towards the Malayan Chinese 1941-1945," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1, no. 2 (1970); Cheah Boon Kheng, *Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social Conflict During and After the Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1941-1946*, 3rd ed. (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003).

⁷ See: Pang Yang Hwei, "A Tangled Web of Wartime Collaboration & Survival in Singapore: A Chinese Farmer's Experience," in *Reflections and Interpretations*, ed. Daniel Chew et al. (Singapore: Oral History Centre, 2005), 227-248.

archaic customs.”⁸ The Straits-born’s fixation on western culture and politics drove a wedge between them and the China-born, and historians presented them as culturally and politically distant from mainland China.⁹ By contrast, the China-born Chinese were deeply involved in the politics of their homeland and in the preservation of their culture and customs. China-born entrepreneurs privately funded Chinese schools to teach younger generations about Chinese history, language, and culture.¹⁰ Moreover, the founding of the Kuomintang (KMT) branch in Singapore in 1912 and the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in 1925 demonstrated their engagement with mainland Chinese politics, which British authorities viewed as subversive.¹¹ As a result, the Straits-born and the China-born were consistently portrayed as incompatible parties.

Realistically, the success of the Chinese community in Malaya and Singapore depended heavily on the collaboration of the Straits-born and the China-born. The role of the Straits-born Chinese in the development of the community’s political consciousness has long been overlooked by many historians. In the pre-colonial period, the Chinese community crafted intricate kinship and mercantile networks through centuries of migration to and from Southeast Asia or the Nanyang (“South Seas”).¹² Since the 1600s, these networks connected the southern port cities of Xiamen and Quanzhou in the Fujian province to Chinese communities in the Philippines, Java, Siam, Borneo, and Malaya.¹³ Until the 18th century, most Chinese migrants

⁸ Mrs. Reginald Sanderson, "The Population of Malaya," in *Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources*, ed. Arnold Wright and H. A. Cartwright (London: Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 213.

⁹ Yong Ching Fatt, "Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Singapore during the 1930s," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 8, no. 2 (1977): 195-96, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20070224>.

¹⁰ Ganesan Shanmugavelu et al., "Development of British Colonial Education in Malaysia, 1816-1957," *Shanlax International Journal of Education* 8, no. 2 (2020): 11-12.

¹¹ Png Poh Seng, "The Kuomintang in Malaya, 1912-1941," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 2, no. 1 (1961): 1, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20067317>; Cheah, *Red Star Over Malaya*, 14.

¹² Craig A. Lockyard, "Chinese Migration and Settlement in Southeast Asia Before 1850: Making Fields From the Sea," *History Compass* 11, no. 9 (2013): 766.

¹³ Neal, "The Singapore Model," 16.

hailed from central and southern Fujian where Hokkien was the main dialect.¹⁴ Many Straits-born Chinese were of Hokkien ancestry, and their close kinship and mercantile connections allowed them to dominate trade and commercial circles in the Nanyang even after British colonialization in 1819.¹⁵ These networks were not exclusive to the Hokkien community, however, as migrants and merchants from Guangdong and Hainan also constructed similar structures to cement their foothold in the Nanyang.

Kinship ties were extremely crucial in maintaining the community's influence and power over the region. For example, Hokkien networks were maintained by systems of adoption and marriage, as Mark Frost argues:

Hokkien family enterprises were expanded by the adoption of sons who were sent overseas to serve as business assistants and sometimes through the adoption of 'brothers' resident in overseas ports. Merchants with daughters encouraged their sons-in-law to live in the family home and become commercial partners.¹⁶

In Malaya, Straits Chinese families often married their daughters to new arrivals from the mainland, and sometimes "pregnant wives were also sent to China so a new generation would be born on ancestral soil before spending the rest of their lives abroad."¹⁷ Similar patterns tying kinship relations to commercial networks also occurred within other dialect groups like the Cantonese, the Teochews, the Hakkas, and the Hainanese. These marriages demonstrated how the Straits Chinese were actively seeking to retain their connections to the mainland.

When western powers arrived in the Nanyang, they utilized these networks to their advantage to control the Chinese population. When the Portuguese colonized Malacca in 1511, they enlisted Tay Kie Ki, a wealthy Fujian-born Hokkien, as the *kapitan* (chief), to lead the

¹⁴ Lockyard, "Chinese Migration and Settlement Before 1850," 767.

¹⁵ Lockyard, "Chinese Migration and Settlement Before 1850," 768.

¹⁶ Mark Ravinder Frost, "Emporium in Imperio: Nanyang Networks and the Straits Chinese in Singapore, 1819- 1914," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 36, no. 1 (2005): 35, <http://www.jstor.com/stable/20072628>.

¹⁷ Frost, "Emporium in Imperio," 37-38.

Malaccan Chinese community.¹⁸ These delegations of power by colonial authorities coincided with the establishment of clan associations that allowed Chinese community leaders to organize and expand their networks even further. These clan associations allowed Chinese migrants who shared “common recent ancestry, came from the same village or district, and spoke a common dialect” to congregate and build their own localized networks of kinship and commerce.¹⁹ Clan organizations extended existing networks past the bonds of family and marriage, reconfiguring ideas of kinship along regional lines. Furthermore, clan associations allowed the Chinese community to preserve their traditions and culture. As Yen Ching-Hwang noted, clan organizations emerged in response to the demand “to observe traditional Chinese customs such as ancestral worship and festivals” by Chinese migrants.²⁰ Naturally, it fell to the wealthy merchants in the clan to fund and sponsor these events, which provided them with greater power and influence. Just as European powers depended on the prominent merchants of the region to administer the Chinese, these clan organizations were centered on the leadership of the wealthiest merchants.

Clan subdivisions, referred to as *fang* (room or house), created small spheres of kinship and loyalty within the larger clan network. Members of a *fang* typically shared similar genealogical lineages and hailed from the same neighborhood or district.²¹ Members were “grouped together as units for distribution of responsibility and power within the structure of the lineage (clan); members of the same *fang* tended to mingle socially, cared about each other more, and tended to offer more generous assistance in times of need.”²² These associations allowed

¹⁸ Lockyard, “Chinese Migration and Settlement Before 1850,” 769.

¹⁹ Yen Ching-Hwang, “Early Chinese Clan Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819-1911,” *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 12, no. 1 (1970): 65, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20070413>.

²⁰ Yen, “Early Chinese Clan Organizations,” 63.

²¹ Yen, “Early Chinese Clan Organizations,” 70.

²² Yen, “Early Chinese Clan Organizations,” 70.

newcomers to easily integrate into local networks and offered immediate resources for members to utilize in a new social landscape under western colonial rule.

As a result of British colonization of the peninsula, Straits-born Chinese were registered as British subjects, which introduced a new realm of economic and social opportunities. Their economic genius made them an indispensable group within the colonial state, and the Straits Chinese served as “official justices of the peace, magistrates and jurors” in the British administration.²³ Despite having a greater role in the British colonial state, Straits Chinese families still sought to maintain their connections to their Chinese heritage. For example, Guangdong-born Teochew merchant Seah Eu Chin “provided his four local-born sons with private tuition in Chinese at home while sending them to English-language schools...”²⁴ The trend of marrying local-born daughters to China-born migrants continued until the beginning of the twentieth century, and their children became important “cultural brokers” between China and Malaya.²⁵ Other China-born lineages and their Straits-born sons followed similar patterns of education and marriage, creating a group of multilingual merchants, officials, and professionals that maneuvered between the colonial state and the Chinese community.

Although the overseas Chinese diaspora was becoming increasingly entrenched in colonial society, the community remained highly attentive to the political and social changes of China. Two key events at the end of the nineteenth century led to the rise of political activism within the Chinese population; the first was the Confucianist reform movement (1895-1898) led by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao, and the second was the failed ‘Hundred Days Reform’ of 1898.

²³ Frost, “Emporium in Imperio,” 40.

²⁴ Frost, “Emporium in Imperio,” 40.

²⁵ Lockyard, “Chinese Migration and Settlement Before 1850,” 769.

Firstly, the Confucianist reform movement emerged after the Qing's defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Kang Youwei believed that a progressive reading and implementation of Confucian classics would lead to a modernized China devoid of foreign religious practices.²⁶ Straits Chinese leaders strongly advocated for the Confucianist reform movement in Malaya, and their interpretation of the campaign spawned a more radical vision of Confucianist reform in Singapore.²⁷ Led by Peranakan leader Lim Boon Keng, the Singaporean Confucianist reform movement attacked traditional Chinese practices of ancestral worship, *fengshui* (Chinese geomancy), and ostentatious religious festivals.²⁸ Lim viewed Confucius as a "scientific sage," which "proved of great significance to Chinese living in British- and Dutch-controlled parts of the Nanyang, because it allowed those who styled themselves as 'progressives' in the light of their Western education...to participate in revival."²⁹ This not only indicates that the Straits Chinese were actively involved in discussions of Chinese politics and ideological movements, but they were also utilizing these campaigns to reconcile their "Chinese-ness" with their "British-ness".

Secondly, the failure of the Hundred Days Reform of 1898 aroused the political consciousness of the overseas Chinese diaspora. Partnerships between Straits Chinese, China-born Chinese, and Chinese revolutionaries were integral to the development of Chinese political activism in Singapore and Malaya. Drawing on existing networks, Chinese revolutionaries utilized both Straits Chinese and China-born Chinese contacts to move through the peninsula, fund their causes, and publicize their lectures. Singapore, which had the largest concentration of

²⁶ Frost, "Emporium in Imperio," 55.

²⁷ Frost, "Emporium in Imperio," 55.

²⁸ The term *Peranakan* is an Indonesian and Malay word that literally means "uterus or womb" and refers to an interracial marriage between a "local" (indigenous Malays) and "foreigner" (any non-Malay person). Between the late 19th to mid-20th century, the terms *Peranakan* and Straits Chinese were interchangeably used. However, not all Straits-born Chinese are *Peranakan*, but all *Peranakan* are Straits-born.

²⁹ Frost, "Emporium in Imperio," 57.

Chinese in the peninsula, was the headquarters of two important Chinese political organizations: Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *Tong Meng Hui* and the KMT Singapore branch.³⁰ These organizations would not have been established without access to the extensive Nanyang networks that were led by both Straits Chinese and China-born Chinese merchants. Dr. Sun was supported by Tan Chor Lam and Lim Nee Soon, who sheltered him from colonial authorities and sponsored his lecture tours across the peninsula. Both Tan Chor Lam and Lim Nee Soon were born in Singapore and thus were British subjects, but like Seah Eu Chin's sons, they received both a private Chinese education and an English education. With the establishment of the *Tong Meng Hui* Singapore branch, the precursor to the KMT Singapore branch, in 1905, Tan Chor Lam was elected president with Lim Nee Soon as the social relations secretary.³¹ Many members of the *Tong Meng Hui* would fill the ranks of the KMT Singapore branch when it was founded in 1912. A closer look at KMT leadership reveals that leadership was not limited to birthplace, as many like Tan Chor Lam and Lim Nee Soon were British subjects. This indicates that the Chinese community perceived their British subjecthood as a key to social and economic opportunities but not an absolute declaration of their loyalty.

Straits-born Chinese participation in mainland Chinese politics caused friction between them and the British colonial state. The founding of the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) in 1900 was Lim Boon Keng's response to British criticisms of his activity in Chinese politics and to Qing attempts to claim generations of settled Chinese as its subjects in the late nineteenth century. The SCBA was constructed to reassure the British colonial state of the Straits-born Chinese "loyalty," so that the Straits-born Chinese could protect the "inestimable

³⁰ Png, "Kuomintang in Malaya," 2-5. Dr. Sun Yat-sen made a total of nine visits to Malaya between 1900-1911. His fourth visit led to the opening of the Singapore *Tong Meng Hui* branch.

³¹ Png, "Kuomintang in Malaya," 4-5.

advantages” they received as British subjects.³² Historians associated the increased political activity of the Straits-born Chinese in British colonial politics as a statement of their distance from mainland China. As Png Poh-seng noted:

The Straits Chinese associated the British with progress and advancement. Having seen the backwardness and weakness of their ancestral land, China, they saw only one way by which they could ensure their own material advancement, namely, by being loyal subjects of the British Empire.³³

However, this was not the only a concern of the Straits-born Chinese. The ebb and flow of Chinese political activity between 1925 to 1937 indicates that China-born Chinese were also concerned with “their own material advancement.” As the British increased efforts to suppress the KMT in the mid-1920s, both Straits-born Chinese and China-born Chinese reconsidered their political involvement in favor of protecting their economic and social networks.

Between 1919 and 1924, the admittance of left-wing members into the KMT resulted in a surge of night schools that promoted anti-British and anti-imperialist propaganda.³⁴ Eventually, these members, mainly middle- and working-class Chinese, found support with the Shanghai-based Far East Bureau of the Communist International (Comintern) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the late 1920s to form the MCP, but they would be continually suppressed by the British until the Japanese invasion of Singapore in 1942.³⁵ Concern over anti-British (and anti-colonial) sentiment prompted the colonial administration to impose stronger restrictions on the KMT. Moreover, the growing extremism of the KMT under the leadership of left-wing members was increasingly unattractive to most of the Chinese community. As Png noted, “the Chinese in Malaya were beginning to think more of their livelihood than of getting involved in political

³² Frost, “Emporium in Imperio,” 61.

³³ Png, “Kuomintang in Malaya,” 101.

³⁴ Png, “Kuomintang in Malaya,” 20.

³⁵ Yong, “Leadership and Power,” 199.

affairs.”³⁶ Furthermore, the Great Depression in 1929 heavily impacted Chinese entrepreneurs, who mainly engaged in manufacturing industries.³⁷ The economic conditions of the period led to the wealthy leaders of the community to focus on the protection of their businesses over the propagation of political ideas. Contrary to the portrayal of the avid Chinese political activist, political involvement waxed and waned as the community considered the consequences of being associated with anti-colonial political sentiment.

The Japanese invasion of China in 1937 reinvigorated Chinese political activism and saw the Chinese community looking to China-born leaders, who were more invested in the campaigns against the Japanese. Yong Ching Fatt explained this shift in leadership as a result of the Straits-born Chinese leaders purposefully distancing themselves from mainland Chinese politics, preferring to maintain a neutral political stance.³⁸ Mark Frost further argued that their position as leaders in the Chinese-oriented networks were “challenged by a number of new local and international forces.”³⁹ The more that the Straits-born Chinese leaned into their British-ness to fulfill their self-interests such as protecting their enterprises or securing the benefits of British subjecthood, the more distant they were from the Chinese networks that they once led. This increasing distance allowed China-born leaders like Tan Kah Kee to take the reins of Chinese leadership in the community. Another factor was Tan Kah Kee’s “non-partisan” image, which the British preferred over co-opting either KMT or MCP leaders. Yong Ching Fatt suggested that Tan Kah Kee’s non-partisanship was the main reason behind his success as a leader, as the British were more willing to trust Tan Kah Kee and the other non-partisan elite.⁴⁰ Although some

³⁶ Png, “Kuomintang in Malaya,” 21-22.

³⁷ W. G. Huff, “Entitlements, Destitution, and Emigration in the 1930s Singapore Great Depression,” *The Economic History Review* 54, no. 2 (2001): 300.

³⁸ Yong, “Leadership and Power,” 196.

³⁹ Frost, “Emporium in Imperio,” 66.

⁴⁰ Yong, “Leadership and Power,” 199.

Straits-born Chinese leaders engaged in anti-Japanese campaigns from 1937 to 1942, they would have little influence within Tan Kah Kee's sprawling network.

Tan Kah Kee also successfully mobilized the overseas Chinese diaspora through the exploitation of clan and *fang* networks in the Singapore Chinese China Relief General Association (SCCRGA), a voluntary fund-raising organization. The SCCRGA, founded in 1937, gathered 118 Chinese associations and organized them into larger dialect groupings, which were headed by a relief chairperson of the respective dialect group.⁴¹ It effectively connected clan associations and *fang* groups together under a shared dialect instead of a shared hometown or birthplace. This also alienated the Straits Chinese, who were increasingly distant from their ancestral origins and thus disconnected from these clan and *fang* networks.

Although Tan Kah Kee was known for his non-partisanship in the pre-Occupation era, the ranks that filled the SCCRGA consisted of non-partisan, KMT, and MCP agents. KMT supporters, however, dominated the ranks of the SCCRGA. There were two reasons for this: one, non-partisan Chinese and KMT members typically hailed from the elite mercantile class, which traditionally filled positions of leadership within the Chinese community; and two, the MCP contrarily consisted of the proletariat (workers, laborers, union leaders, etc.) and the petty bourgeoisie (clerks, teachers, journalists, etc.).⁴² The KMT-oriented character of the Chinese elite mercantile class featured prominently in the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC) formed in 1906, which was a conglomerate of the community's most reputable and wealthy clan leaders and entrepreneurs.⁴³ In fact, the SCCC's structure was the precursor to Tan Kah Kee's SCCRGA with its dependence on *fang* networks to navigate and expand Chinese

⁴¹ Pang, 278.

⁴² Yong, "Leadership and Power," 199.

⁴³ Yong, "Leadership and Power," 196.

interests in commercial spheres. Tan Kah Kee, a non-partisan member of the elite, remained the face of the SCCC to suppress British suspicions of Chinese mobilization and political activity, but many of his executive co-members had KMT ties like KMT founder Lim Nee Soon and active KMT member Lim Keng Lian.⁴⁴ As a result, the SCCRGA, despite its non-partisan leader Tan Kah Kee, had both KMT-leaning and non-partisan members. The KMT character of the SCCRGA and the success of the association would affect who the Japanese persecuted in the initial stages of the Occupation.

While the KMT and the non-partisan Chinese rallied under the British-backed SCCRGA, the MCP members, many of whom were reluctant to collaborate with KMT members, began their own voluntary fund-raising organization, known as the Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy Backing-Up Society (AEBUS).⁴⁵ MCP leadership was consistently fractured, especially since they lacked significant economic backing and social influence unlike the KMT and the non-partisan elite. Their anti-colonial stance was also a factor that made them unpopular with the British administration. AEBUS, despite being an anti-Japanese campaign, was persecuted by the British administration, who arrested several of their leaders in response to its founding.⁴⁶ The MCP's rise to power would begin with the Japanese Occupation through Communist-led guerilla forces. Until 1942, the MCP networks were in disarray, while KMT networks experienced much more stability under the leadership of non-partisans like Tan Kah Kee and with the backing of the British colonial state.

The only Straits-born in a position of leadership was Ching Kee Sun, the relief

⁴⁴ Yong, "Leadership and Power," 197.

⁴⁵ Yong, "Leadership and Power," 199-200.

⁴⁶ Yong, "Leadership and Power," 200.

chairperson of the Cantonese division and a first-generation Straits Chinese.⁴⁷ By the 1930s, some Straits-born Chinese and most of the *Peranakans* had lost their ability to converse in their dialect and in Mandarin, which disqualified them from these clan associations and their *fang* subdivisions. Without any fluency or literacy in Mandarin, this group was isolated from traditionally Chinese networks. As a result, except for Ching Kee Sun and other first-generation Straits Chinese, SCCRGA was dominated by China-born and Chinese-educated Chinese.

The SCCRGA was active from 1937 to 1941 and was successful for three reasons: one, the leaders were able to reconfigure established systems of remittance and networks of kinship to their advantage; two, grassroots patriotism spurred by competitive dialect parochialism extended the SCCRGA's influence into schools, clubs, and workplaces; and three, the colonial administration green-lighted and sponsored the founding of the SCCRGA.⁴⁸ First, remittance of money to mainland China was a fundamental marker of the China-born identity, as it demonstrated their strong kinship ties to their families and their villages on the mainland. The Chinese-owned banks that facilitated these transactions for Chinese migrants in the early 1900s utilized these established networks to move the raised money from Singapore to China to support the Chinese resistance against the Japanese during the Second Sino-Japanese War.⁴⁹

Second, the SCCRGA also utilized more personal methods of mobilization, as pioneered by the Cantonese group, like creating "relief boxes" to collect from hawkers and small businesses, selling commodities at strategic locations in Singapore, and organizing plays to

⁴⁷ "A Siglap Tale Of Kee Sun Avenue And Seaside Villa," Remember Singapore, last modified March 15, 2020, <https://remembersingapore.org/2020/03/15/kee-sun-avenue-seaside-villa/>.

⁴⁸ Pang Wing Seng, "The 'Double-Seventh' Incident, 1937: Singapore Chinese Response to the Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 4, no. 2 (1973): 277, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20070052>.

⁴⁹ Yong Ching Fatt, "A Preliminary Study of Chinese Leadership in Singapore, 1900-1941," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 9, no. 2 (1968): 261.

spread information about the relief fund.⁵⁰ This tied the Chinese at all levels of society from the hawker to the entrepreneur together under a shared dialect. While it drew members of the same dialect group even closer, it also introduced competition between dialect groups. As Pang noted, "...the attempts by dialect groups to emulate and compete with one another in relief collections provided that extra intensity and gloss to the whole relief campaign which would otherwise have been lacking."⁵¹ Lastly, with the backing of the colonial administration, Chinese in the SCCRGA did not have to fear punishment for their participation in a Chinese political movement. This was important, as it eased the tensions between the SCCRGA and the colonial administration and allowed the community to participate more vigorously than before.

The astounding response from the overseas Chinese diaspora to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on the Chinese mainland after July 1937 impressed the Japanese administration, as they observed the massive amounts of money moving from the Nanyang to China. Additionally, Japanese industries felt the pinch of the anti-Japanese boycott led by Chinese trade guilds and merchant houses in their key export industries.⁵² The impact of these anti-Japanese campaigns affected how Japanese military policymakers planned for the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.⁵³ It was imperative that the Japanese administration attempted to make full use of the economic power of the Chinese community. For example, the Japanese-sponsored Overseas Chinese Association (OCA), established in March 1942, mirrored the structure of the Tan Kah Kee-led Singapore Chinese China Relief General Association (SCCRGA).⁵⁴ The OCA, however, had none of the same tools and privileges that the

⁵⁰ Pang, "Double-Seventh Incident," 279.

⁵¹ Pang, "Double-Seventh Incident," 280.

⁵² Pang, "Double-Seventh Incident," 283.

⁵³ See: Jeremy A. Yellen, *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: When Total Empire Met Total War* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2019)

⁵⁴ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 72.

SCCRGA had, and it was even more challenging to encourage the Chinese to cooperate with the Japanese after the violent discrimination of the *kempeitai* (Imperial Japanese military police) in the first month of the Occupation. Furthermore, the Japanese utilized same patterns of co-opting Chinese leaders to administer the community. However, Chinese leaders not only lacked social and economic mobility due to the restrictions imposed by the Japanese, but they also were predominantly Straits Chinese, who no longer navigated within clan and *fang* networks.

When the Japanese invaded Singapore, many Chinese community leaders went into hiding because they knew that they would be targets of Japanese aggression. These included non-partisan leaders like Tan Kah Kee, who fled to a town in East Java.⁵⁵ The KMT Singapore branch was heavily affected by the Japanese avid pursuit of them in the preliminary stages of the Occupation. Some continued their connections to the mainland. War hero, Lim Bo Seng, for example, fled to India before making his way to Chongqing, where he was welcomed by Chiang Kai-shek's administration. He was appointed to the position of colonel and then deployed to Kolkata (Calcutta), where he was assigned with the task of training Chinese naval officers.⁵⁶ Others joined the guerilla forces in the jungle, and many more dispersed and went into hiding.⁵⁷ The lack of local KMT formation impacted the future of the Singapore KMT branch. By the end of the war in 1945, the local KMT branch would attempt to make a comeback, especially against the MCP's contending interest in Malayan politics, but their scattered ranks, severe disorganization, and continued persecution by the British killed the KMT in Malaya. Unlike their counterparts in Indonesia, where the events of the ongoing Chinese Civil War between Chiang

⁵⁵ Tan Liok Ee, "Descent and Identity: The Different Paths of Tan Cheng Lock, Tan Kah Kee and Lim Lian Geok," *Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society* 68, no. 1 (1995): 14, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41493262>.

⁵⁶ Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack, *War Memory and the Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2012), 123.

⁵⁷ Png, "Kuomintang in Malaya," 31.

Kai-shek's administration and Mao Ze Dong's CCP, heavily affected the tone and character of Chinese politics after the end of the war, the KMT Singapore branch dissolved before 1948.⁵⁸

With most of the influential China-born leaders in hiding, the Japanese turned to the Straits-born Chinese. The Japanese did not seem to care that these individuals were Straits-born and that their loyalty to the Chinese cause was questioned less than five years ago. As Shinozaki Mamoru, Japanese foreign press attaché and pre-war spy for the Japanese government, observed:

One day, the Kempei brought to my hotel...Dr. Lim Boon Keng... The Kempei corporal showed me a newspaper cutting of a picture showing the doctor sitting with a military mission from Chungking (Chongqing). He handed me another piece of paper: it was a letter of thanks bearing the stamp of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek. 'Look!' exclaimed the corporal excitedly.⁵⁹

The documents of Dr. Lim's activities with the KMT originated from British records of Chinese political activity, which the Japanese accessed and utilized to hunt down anti-Japanese dissidents.⁶⁰ Dr. Lim's connection to Chiang Kai-shek was enough to prove his "Chinese-ness" to the Japanese, but Dr. Lim's status as a British subject was never mentioned. Shinozaki himself makes no mention of it despite his knowledge of Dr. Lim and his influence in the Chinese community.

As a result, Dr. Lim Boon Keng became the OCA's president, while a handful of well-known Straits Chinese filled the rest of the executive positions. Some of these key individuals were the OCA's vice-president Wong Siew Qui, who was born in Singapore in 1888; director Robert Tan Hoon Siang, the great-grandson of Tan Tock Seng, a pioneer leader of the Straits Chinese community in the early nineteenth century, and director Dr. Hu Tsai Kuen, a *Peranakan*

⁵⁸ See: Zhou Taomo, *Migration in the Time of Revolution: China, Indonesia, and the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).

⁵⁹ Shinozaki Mamoru, *Syonan—My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1975), 25-26.

⁶⁰ Shinozaki, *Syonan—My Story*, 25.

of Hakka descent.⁶¹ The Singapore OCA was the main branch, but the Japanese had also established OCAs in other districts as well. In these other OCAs, Straits Chinese businessmen also filled leadership positions. For example, the leader of the Johor committee was Cheok Huan Cheong, who held a governmental position in the colonial administration and advocated for solidarity between the China and Britain in 1941.⁶² Shinozaki was appointed as an advisor to the OCA, but the OCA reported to Takase, who oversaw Chinese affairs in the *gunseibu* (Military Administration of Syonan-Malaya).

Takase's intentions for the OCA was outlined in the *Kakyo kosaku jisshi yoryo* ("Principles and Policies Governing Toward the Chinese"). The document expressed the administration's desire "to utilize them for the destruction of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the settlement of the Sino-Japanese War" and "demanded the Chinese to raise a minimum of 50 million dollars for its administrative funds."⁶³ The SCCGRA only managed to raise ten million dollars under the pressure and systematic organization of dialect groups, but the Japanese administration expected the OCA to quintuple that in a month.⁶⁴ Furthermore, the structure of the OCA as organized by the Japanese was not based on dialect groups unlike the SCCGRA, which was a defining factor in its success. As a result, the OCA and the Japanese administration had to devise a new strategy to raise fifty million in a brief period.

There were several obstacles that the OCA had to overcome in their planning. The first was the reaction of the Chinese community towards the Sook Ching Massacre. The Sook Ching Massacre began in the early weeks of the Occupation on February 21, 1942, about a week after

⁶¹ Shinozaki, *Syonan—My Story*, 29.

⁶² "Johore Appointments," *Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser*, January 27, 1941, NewspaperSG; "Chinese Community Launch Aid-Britain Week," *Straits Times*, September 3, 1941, NewspaperSG; "Generous Donations Prove Sincerity," *Syonan Shimbun*, April 16, 1942, NewspaperSG.

⁶³ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 70.

⁶⁴ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 72.

the surrender of the British. The Sook Ching Massacre originated as an inspection campaign of the Chinese community where the *kempeitai* would ideally arrest and severely punish anyone who held anti-Japanese sentiments.⁶⁵ The inspection was devised by General Yamashita and his office, but the executions were conducted by Colonel Oishi of the *kempeitai*.

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⁶⁵ Akashi, “Japanese Policy,” 68.

⁶⁶ Akashi, “Japanese Policy,” 68.

⁶⁷ Akashi, “Japanese Policy,” 68.

⁶⁸ Blackburn and Hack, *War Memory*, 137, 142.

The second obstacle was that pre-Occupation dialect and clan networks utilized by Tan Kah Kee in the SCCRGA no longer functioned as effectively under the Japanese administration. Most clan leaders participated in pre-war anti-Japanese activities, which placed them under heavy scrutiny from the Japanese. As an example, Lee Wee Nam, who was the relief chairman of the Teochew SCCRGA group, was tortured and jailed for his involvement in pre-war anti-Japanese activities.⁶⁹ During the Occupation, Chinese who were suspected of anti-Japanese sentiment had their properties and wealth confiscated by the government.⁷⁰ With most of the prominent clan leaders either in hiding, in jail, or in destitution, clan networks eventually fell apart without central leadership. The weakness of dialect and clan networks resulted in the lackluster mobilization of the Chinese community by the OCA. In contrast to the SCCRGA, the OCA were organized by district and not by dialect group. This division was reflected in the allocation of the fifty million dollars among the OCAs in Malaya.⁷¹ For example, Syonan (Singapore) was required to raise \$10 million, while Johore was only required to raise \$5 million.⁷² Dialect organizations were used “to ensure that no one cheated others in paying his own share,” but this method pitted dialect groups against each other. A Japanese military document translated by Akashi noted that “the properties of the Teochiu (Teochew) people...were examined by the Hylam (Hainanese) examiners. Those of the Hylam were examined by the Hokkien examiners...”⁷³ Akashi did not reveal if the document explained why this was the best arrangement to prevent false reports, but this likely was a product of Japanese involvement in the OCA’s decision-making.

⁶⁹ Joshua Chia Yeong Jia, "Lee Wee Nam," SingaporeInfopedia, last modified June 2019, https://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/infopedia/articles/SIP_1161_2007-04-24.html.

⁷⁰ Cheah, *Red Star Over Malaya*, 37.

⁷¹ Akashi, “Japanese Policy,” 71-72.

⁷² Akashi, “Japanese Policy,” 72.

⁷³ Akashi, “Japanese Policy,” 72.

In more desperate situations, the OCA were pushed to utilize forceful methods to squeeze fifty million dollars from the community in a brief period. This can be observed with the Perak Chinese, whose quota was in disproportion to their population. As Perak's payment schedule fell behind, members of the OCA's contribution committee petitioned for police involvement. The police then threatened "recalcitrant and evading" Chinese to inflict "severe punishment for further delay in payment."⁷⁴ The result was a desperate wave of property owners selling all their assets at low prices to meet the quota. This act and the OCAs continued cooperation with the Japanese alienated them from the anti-Japanese guerilla forces, who labeled them as "traitors." The \$50 million "donation" was portrayed as a "gesture of loyalty and sincerity" in a *Syonan Times* article.⁷⁵ The OCA were frequent faces in propaganda pieces published by Japanese-run newspapers to present the Chinese community as sincerely loyal to the administration.

In the beginning stages of the Occupation, the OCA lacked any ability to properly negotiate with the Japanese authorities without being accused or suspected of anti-Japanese sentiment. In the first week of March, the OCA were summoned to meet Takase, who berated them for pre-war anti-Japanese activities and acts of Chinese espionage before demanding them to profess their support for the administration:

"We mean that those of us who have money, give money. Those who have strength, give strength." Scarcely had Lu finished the statement, when Takase barked: "...All your money and even your lives are at our disposal. Get out!..." The next day...they told him that they were here to place all their wealth and lives at the gunseibu's disposal. Pleased with the offer, Takase promised them that he would inform his superiors of the offer.⁷⁶

These stories of mistreatment and coercion continued until late 1942 when there was marked changes in the Japanese attitudes towards the OCA and the Chinese community. The Japanese

⁷⁴ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 73.

⁷⁵ "Chinese To Raise Funds For Nippon," *Syonan Shimbun*, April 9, 1942, NewspaperSG.

⁷⁶ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 71.

hardline policies towards the Chinese community shifted gradually into more moderate forms of incentivized programs and policies that returned a little bit of freedom to the oppressed community. Akashi cited the departure of Takase, an advocate of the hardline regime, the changing tides of the war against Japan in the Pacific, and the economic predicament of families in South China who relied on remittances from the Nanyang for their livelihoods as major reasons that pushed Watanabe, Takase's successor, towards slightly more moderate policies.⁷⁷ The result of this alleviation of pressure allowed the OCA more room to influence decisions in the later stages of the Occupation.

Although the skepticism and mistrust of the Japanese authorities limited the mobility of the OCA, they still aided significantly in the recovery of the community after the Battle of Singapore. An article from August 1942 in the *Syonan Times* demonstrated how the OCA and the Japanese administration were planning "a big scheme to assist the poorer classes of the Chinese community."⁷⁸ The article continued, "The scheme in brief consists of a large number of residential quarters being built by the authorities for the Chinese poor."⁷⁹ This included a renovation of a Chinese temple to house over 600 elderly and impoverished people.⁸⁰ Another way that the OCA aided in the recovery of the island was the distribution of "over 9,000 licenses to Chinese farmers distributed all over the island for the purchase of bran and fodder for purposes of pig and poultry rearing."⁸¹ The OCAs were also active in organizing farming campaigns and hosting Japanese language lessons.⁸² Agriculture campaigns encouraged self-

⁷⁷ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 77-78.

⁷⁸ "Practical Scheme To Aid Distressed Chinese In Syonan," *Syonan Shimbun*, August 26, 1942, NewspaperSG.

⁷⁹ "Practical Scheme," *Syonan Shimbun*, NewspaperSG.

⁸⁰ "\$70,000 To Be Spent On Syonan Refuge To House Infirm Without Adequate Means," *Syonan Shimbun*, October 22, 1942, NewspaperSG.

⁸¹ "Chinese, Malai Farmers Put Syonan Well On Road To Self-Sufficiency In Food," *Syonan Shimbun*, June 24, 1943, NewspaperSG.

⁸² "Farmers Put Syonan On Road To Self-Sufficiency," *Syonan Shimbun*, NewspaperSG.

reliance and responded to the glaring food shortages and rampant racketeering, and farming was also a way to earn money for those who had just lost their assets in the wartime destruction. Japanese lessons were a strategy imposed by the administration to “Japanize” the population, but they were also practical for many members of the community. As Zahari, former editor of the *Utusan Melayu*, noted, “Everywhere, people were crazy about learning Japanese as it suddenly had economic value. Nippon-Go became vital for filling bellies. Without it, you faced hunger... To get a job in a private company or a government department, Japanese was a ‘must.’ Little wonder that Japanese language classes mushroomed in Singapore.”⁸³ These actions were propagandizing projects initiated by the Japanese, but they also were ways for the OCA to exercise what little power they had to help their community.

The Japanese Occupation disrupted the lives of many people, but it was not an interregnum where people passively endured or were pushed into collaboration because there was no other option. Despite the conditions of the Occupation, people actively utilized the resources provided to them by the OCA and the Syonan administration, like farming workshops and language lessons. There was no certainty that the British would ever return or that the war would end in the next three years. The community needed to adapt and carry on without the guidance of their community leaders and the protection of their kinship networks.

When the Chinese community could not depend on their elite leaders and traditional clan and dialect networks to protect them, they actively constructed new networks with whatever remained in the dust of the Occupation. The OCA, despite the constraints of collaborating with the Japanese, aided in the reconstruction of these networks to the best of their ability. Chia Soon Ann, brother-in-law of Lim Chong Pang, who was detained in 1945 for alleged collaboration

⁸³ Pang, “Tangled Web,” 235.

with the Japanese, shared how Lim managed to negotiate with the Japanese authorities and influence them strategically. Despite his anti-Japanese activities, Lim believed that joining the OCA was “for the betterment of the livelihood of the Chinese population in Singapore.”⁸⁴ Prior to the Occupation, Lim was a prominent KMT member and an owner of cinemas and entertainment centers. Chia also shared that Lim negotiated with the Japanese authorities “by telling [them] that, ‘You should not do this but instead I will help the people in a different way.’ So he always overcame the Japanese by another better, more elaborate [idea], without the Japanese feeling [offended].”⁸⁵ Chia’s account of Lim’s activities revealed that the OCA leaders had a lot more agency in their interactions with the Japanese administration. Through subtle tricks of wordplay and appeasement, the OCA were able to dampen and discourage more violent and outrageous Japanese policies.

One criticism of the OCA by historians was the reluctance of the Chinese community to trust them, which prevented the success of their Japanese-sponsored campaigns and worsened relations with the Japanese administration.⁸⁶ Articles in the *Syonan Times* and Japanese observers with the former berating the Chinese for the reluctant participation and the latter lamenting that early Japanese policies had harmed later relations with the community corroborated these perspectives.⁸⁷ Chia’s interview suggested that the OCA leaders found support with the rural Chinese. When the British Military Administration (BMA) arrested Lim in 1945, Chia shared that he had approached two groups for aid: the impoverished villagers and the rice traders. As Chia noted, “...we had practically all the support from the villagers, the poor.

⁸⁴ Chia Soon Ann, "Reel 3," interview by Tan Beng Luan, *Japanese Occupation of Singapore*, 1986.

⁸⁵ Ann, "Reel 3."

⁸⁶ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 75.

⁸⁷ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 69; Shinozaki, *Syonan—My Story*, 30; “Local Chinese Affairs,” *Syonan Shimbun*, June 20, 1942, NewspaperSG.

And on the other side – when I appeal for help, [the rice traders] were not forthcoming.”⁸⁸ The silence of the rice traders in the defense of Lim was understandable. Lim was on trial as a suspected collaborator, and the rice traders, who worked with both Japanese and Chinese consumers, were afraid that they would be accused as traitors as well. Nevertheless, Lim’s relationship with the rice traders revealed that the OCA also utilized black-market networks and connections. In fact, Chia stated that Lim rescued the sons of the rice traders from going into forced labor.⁸⁹ This indicated that the OCA also had enough pull within the Japanese administration to rescue members of the Chinese community from punishments or forced labor. Chia’s picture of Lim’s time as a leader in the OCA contradicted dominant perspectives of the OCA’s weakness and passiveness in the Japanese Occupation.

Prewar Chinese leaders were no longer the ones in power, as they lacked the same pre-Occupation resources that made them natural leaders of the community. With the absence of effective leadership, the prewar social hierarchy crumbled. In its stead, a new social order was constructed amidst the chaos and the destruction. A new “elite”, who could afford a comfortable lifestyle due to their resourcefulness and strategic collaboration, replaced the old prewar elite. The Chinese community of the Occupation was centered around farmers, clerks, provisions suppliers, teachers, translators, village officials, mistresses of Japanese soldiers, owners of entertainment establishments, and businessmen with prior Japanese connections. Populated by the lower and middle classes of the community, these were non-traditional professions of the prewar elite, who were manufacturing entrepreneurs. Professions involved with the production and distribution of food experienced the most benefits during the Occupation due to the lack of food, especially rice, among the civilian population.

⁸⁸ Chia Soon Ann, "Reel 6," interview by Tan Beng Luan, *Japanese Occupation of Singapore*, 1986.

⁸⁹ Ann, "Reel 6."

The scarcity of food and the inflation of prices were significant issues during the Occupation. As Hong Suen Wong noted, “by the end of 1942, prices were 12-15 times their pre-war level... The war disrupted rice-growing patterns, trade and movement of goods completely as merchant ships were sunk and pulled out for war efforts.”⁹⁰ Subsistence farming was never a major industry in Malaya, relying instead on food imports to feed the population.⁹¹ While the Malays were dominant in rice cultivation, they never produced enough to fully overcome the peninsula’s dependence on food imports. Furthermore, most Chinese farmers focused on export-oriented agriculture like gambier, tapioca, and pepper instead of staple products like rice.⁹² Rice was incredibly important during the Occupation because it was a staple item in both the Malayan and Japanese diets. With the disruption of the war, rice imports from Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand were interrupted, leading to a severe rice shortage. Furthermore, the exploitation of supplies and commodities by Japanese corporations, the *kumiai* (guild association), and the *rikenyas* (concession hunting profiteers) exacerbated these shortages and raised the barrier to entry for the Chinese businesses.⁹³ In an effort to resolve these shortages, the Japanese administration implemented sale restrictions on most commodities and introduced a rations system for all essential food staples. For example, each household was issued a rice card that measured the amount of rice each family was allotted, which differed by gender and age.⁹⁴ The result was a thriving black market that was run by a network of *kumiai*, farmers, and intermediaries.

For farmers like Tang, the war was “a priceless window of opportunity” as it “brought to

⁹⁰ Hong Suen Wong, "Food Supplies: A Matter of Control," in *Wartime Kitchen: Food and Eating in Singapore, 1942-1950*, ed. Valerie Ho (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2009), 18.

⁹¹ Paul H. Kratoska, "Rice Cultivation and the Ethnic Division of Labor in British Malaya," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24, no. 2 (1982): 282, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/178586>.

⁹² Jackson, "Chinese Agricultural Pioneering in Singapore and Johore 1800-1917," 77.

⁹³ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 81; Cheah, *Red Star Over Malaya*, 37.

⁹⁴ Wong, "Food Supplies," 20.

the top a *nouveau riche* class of enterprising businessmen, racketeers and gamblers. It offered profitable opportunities as middlemen to the former echelons of the society, the hawkers and the rickshaw pullers.”³⁹ One article mentioned that “[a] large amount of hardship and distress amongst the Chinese, as well as other communities, exists, solely through this food-profiteering, the hoarding of food supplies and the withholding of food supplies from sale merely to force up prices on the part of certain Chinese merchants.”⁹⁵ Tang was one of many individuals, who profited through wartime collaboration as a black market supplier of eggs and chickens.⁴¹ However, Tang and many others in this rising class capitalized on prewar networks to maintain their supplies. Informants, factory supervisors, mistresses of Japanese soldiers, provisions suppliers, and bankers were able to manipulate their connections to the Japanese for a life without fear of starvation or death.⁹⁶ As Lee Kuan Yew noted, “Knowing somebody in authority, whether a Japanese or a Taiwanese interpreter with links to the Japanese, was very important and could be a life-saver.”⁹⁷ These people became new leaders of the community whose connections helped them and others to survive.

The Japanese administration also utilized the black-market networks to resolve food shortages. Finding a balance between feeding their military and the civilians was a major issue for the Japanese authorities. Singapore was the “military supply center for the [Southeast Asia] region through which goods channeled towards the war efforts were collected.”⁹⁸ It was common for Japanese businesses, *kumiai*, and military officers to exploit the black-market supply for their own benefit. As Hong Suen Wong observed, “up to the time of the surrender of the Japanese,

⁹⁵ “Local Chinese Affairs,” *Syonan Shimibun*, June 20, 1942, NewspaperSG.

⁹⁶ Pang, “Tangled Web,” 235.

⁹⁷ Lee Kuan Yew, *The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew*. (Singapore: Times Editions Pte Ltd, 1998), 60.

⁹⁸ Hong, “Food Supplies,” 19.

many reported encountering military stores, government godowns and warehouses that contained plentiful supplies of rice.”⁹⁹ A large proportion of supplies were channeled to feed and sustain the military, and it was common for Japanese soldiers to participate in the black market as well.¹⁰⁰ However, these portrayals excluded the role of the supplier like Tang or distributors like Kenneth Chia, who “brought the goods to the kampungs, remote, out of town places...”¹⁰¹ Through the exploitation of the black market, Tang and Chia lived fairly comfortably during the Occupation. The black market was not a one-sided network that the Japanese ran; it was a mutual exchange between local suppliers, distributors, and Japanese businesses. For example, Teochew rice traders “were officially mobilized within the *Epposho* (reading clubs), an agency through which the Chinese residents could voice their grievances and cooperate voluntarily with the Japanese authorities.”¹⁰² These traders were responsible for keeping the rice supply from Thailand to Malaysia open by using their contacts with Teochew rice traders in Thailand and operating junks on existing trade routes to ferry the supplies over.¹⁰³ The example of the Teochew rice traders demonstrated that not all black market networks had to be created and that some were able to rely on prewar networks to facilitate their trade. This was not limited to rice traders; Chinese merchants, who had prior connections with Japanese businesses, also depended on those prewar mercantile networks to live comfortably.¹⁰⁴

By the end of the Japanese Occupation in 1945, these networks would continue to function as Singapore entered a state of economic recovery. As Lee Kuan Yew noted, “Even locals who had worked for the government could not just go back to their old offices, and many

⁹⁹ Hong, "Food Supplies," 20.

¹⁰⁰ Akashi, "Japanese Policy," 81-82.

¹⁰¹ Pang, "Tangled Web," 233.

¹⁰² Cheah, *Red Star Over Malaya*, 48.

¹⁰³ Cheah, *Red Star Over Malaya*, 48.

¹⁰⁴ Pang, "Tangled Web," 235.

remained unemployed. It was a world in turmoil where the hucksters flourished in Singapore as they did in Britain. Much of the day-to-day business was still done on the black – now the free – market.”¹⁰⁵ Black-market networks remained extremely relevant and significant to a population that was trying to reacquire prewar assets and re-establish themselves under a new administration again. As Tan Wah Meng, a Japanese-appointed three-star neighborhood leader and a grocery store owner during the Occupation, highlighted in his interview, “...when the British came back...I should say everything a lot of black market... All the thing is so shortage. People becoming to buy black market.”¹⁰⁶ When the British returned, the declaration that the Japanese currency had no value caused many businesses to lose a lot of money. Tan stated that he would use the black market to reconstruct his business with more capital to make up for his losses.¹⁰⁷ As rationing continued in the postwar period, Tan, who once handled rice and staple rations during the Japanese Occupation, found himself allocating rations once more under the BMA.¹⁰⁸ Tan’s success as a retail business during the Occupation was also due to his prewar connections to retailers and suppliers that he maintained during the Occupation, which shows how prewar networks were exploited and reconfigured during the Occupation.¹⁰⁹ His story demonstrated that the withdrawal of the Japanese and the return of the British did not indicate an abrupt upheaval of social and economic networks. Instead, the postwar recovery period required Occupation-era networks like the black market to persist.

In the immediate post-war era, networks in the Chinese community that once depended on dialect, business, and clan associations were extant. Old economic networks were

¹⁰⁵ Lee, *The Singapore Story*, 85.

¹⁰⁶ Tan Wah Meng, "Reel 17," interview by Low Lay Leng, *Japanese Occupation of Singapore*, 1983.

¹⁰⁷ Meng, "Reel 17."

¹⁰⁸ Meng, "Reel 17."

¹⁰⁹ Meng, "Reel 17."

reconfigured to reinstate the position of the pre-war urban Chinese elite, who returned to re-establish their enterprises. Meanwhile, the black-market elite continued to utilize their networks not to gain more capital but also to supply the recovering population with its needs especially as the peninsula faced another conflict. The Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) was a guerilla insurgency between the MCP and its military arm, the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), and the military forces of the British Empire and the Commonwealth. The political chaos of the Malayan Emergency allowed various factions to emerge, each with their own vision of the future of Malaya. One of these was the English-educated Chinese, who rose to positions of leadership within the community in the declination of Peranakan Chinese leadership, and were divided into two political parties formed in 1955, the People's Action Party (PAP) and the Democratic Party. The PAP rivaled the Democratic Party, "which was formed...by a handful of millionaires from the Chinese Chamber of Commerce...promoted by the British to capture the [support of the] Chinese masses."¹¹⁰ The ineffectiveness of the Democratic Party was not only due to their pro-British platform but also due to the Chinese community's lack of dependence on old power structures that were dismantled in the Occupation period. The success of the PAP in 1959 signaled a shift in the gallery of leadership from the Chinese mercantile elite to a multiethnic group of English-educated intellectuals. The networks that once bound Singapore to the world were no longer oriented around the Chinese but around the many intersecting identities of the notion of a "Singaporean."

¹¹⁰ Fong Sip Chee, *The PAP Story: The Pioneering Years* (Singapore: Times Periodicals, 1979), 10.

The International Perception of the Irish Republican Army and Chechen Insurgency

Henry Forteith¹

The Irish Republican Army and Chechen insurgency were groups that defined themselves as separate nations fighting against perceived occupational forces. In their minds, they were not terrorists but freedom fighters doing what was necessary to defend their people against an oppressive regime. The difference between how these groups defined themselves and how the governments they fought against characterized them highlights the importance labels have on the perception of groups commonly associated with terrorism. Media networks are powerful in this regard, as their coverage of these conflicts can shape the ways in which these groups are perceived by their international audiences. Acts of violence external to the conflicts occurring in Northern Ireland and Chechnya shaped the ways in which media networks assigned labels to describe the IRA and Chechen insurgency.

The purpose of this article is to explain how acts of violence, such as the September 11 attacks, influenced the media's description of the IRA and Chechen insurgency and how the label of 'terrorist' affected the perception of the Anglo-Irish and Russo-Chechen conflicts. I use quantitative data from the *New York Times* and International Newsstream databases to examine the change in word frequency to describe the IRA and Chechen fighters across a twelve-year span and four-month span before and after certain international events. I also describe the results I obtained from my searches, explaining the percentage stacked column charts I created as well as the values I obtained from ANOVA tests. I also include a qualitative analysis of certain

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articles published before and prior to certain events. I then provide a discussion of the results and explain the power of labels, namely how the label of ‘terrorist’ allowed the human rights abuses of the British and Russian governments during these conflicts to be viewed as necessary counterterrorism operations. Finally, I conclude by summarizing my research and reiterating my argument that acts of violence external to the Anglo-Irish and Russo-Chechen arguments influenced the ways in which media networks assigned labels to the IRA and Chechen insurgency.

Background

Ireland and Chechnya share a history of subjugation to imperial powers – England and Russia respectively – that used force and violence to control the local population of each region. After each territory was conquered, the British Empire and Russian Empire respectively attempted to extinguish Irish and Chechen cultural identity through “assimilation”; Anglicization in the case of the Irish and Russification and later Sovietization in the case of the Chechens. This animosity in Anglo-Irish and Russo-Chechen relations worsened after the mass death of the Irish during the Irish Potato Famine of the 1840s and of the Chechens when they were forcefully deported by the Soviet Union in the 1940s. While both Ireland and Chechnya saw attempts at independence in the early twentieth century, only Ireland achieved partial independence in 1917 while the Chechens did not obtain a sustained form of independence until the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. Even then, the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria eventually fell and was never formally recognized as being independent by the Russian Federation. The desire for a unified Ireland free from English rule and a Chechen Republic separate from Russia motivated the Irish Republican Army and Chechen fighters respectively to commit acts of violence both within their desired areas of independence as well as in their perceived oppressors’ territories. Their acts of violence

against civilians warranted them international condemnation, and both groups never achieved their goal of a united Ireland and independent Chechnya. The similarities between the Chechen insurgency and Irish Republican Army are notable, which is why a cross-comparison between these groups is warranted.

Imperial Conquest of Ireland and Chechnya

Ireland and Chechnya were both subject to an imperial conquest in which foreign powers seized lands and attempted to reshape the local culture to reflect the customs and norms inherent to the imperial metropole. The Tudor Conquest of Ireland in the early 1500s saw the Kingdom of England recapture territories previously held by the English crown as well as gain control of new Irish territories that were left unconquered from the Anglo-Norman invasion centuries prior. While the conquest itself was a manifestation of “colonization, war, deliberate cultural destruction and massacres,” Tudor officials described the invasion of Ireland as an act of ‘reformation,’ by which they meant “the fundamental overhaul of government, law and society, so as to restore... the state of English rule there.”² In addition to politically subjugating and converting Irish Catholics to Protestantism, the Kingdom of England aimed to culturally assimilate and reform the “uncivil natives” by Anglicizing “their apparently barbarous customs, practices, and culture.”³ The English Crown implemented a system known today as “surrender and regrant,” a policy in which Irish chiefs gave up their Gaelic titles and lordships in exchange for being granted English titles and lordships, with the assumption that these chiefs would enforce English laws and culture onto their Irish subjects.⁴ Furthermore, while the Kingdom of

² Christopher Maginn and Steven G. Ellis, *The Tudor Discovery of Ireland* (Four Courts Press, 2015), 17.

³ Kevin Kenny, *The Oxford History of the British Empire: Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 28.

⁴ Christopher Maginn, “‘Surrender and Regrant’ in the Historiography of Sixteenth-Century Ireland,” *The Sixteenth Century Journal* 38, no. 4 (January 2007): p. 955, 955.

England enforced imperial policies to assimilate the Irish into English culture, English citizens back home called “for the destruction of the existing Gaelic order and the systematic colonization of Ireland with English settlers.”⁵ This desire for colonization of Irish lands led to English, Scottish, and Welsh settlers to establish communities in the Northern parts of Ireland in the mid- to late-sixteenth-century. Further restrictions and imperial control were placed upon the Irish through the implementation of penal laws in the 1600s, laws which restricted Catholics in a number of ways, such as preventing them from becoming lawyers or joining the Irish Parliament. The Kingdom of Ireland continued to be enforced through this indirect control of imperial subjugation until 1800, when the Acts of Union was signed by both the Irish and British Parliaments. It declared that “in order to promote and secure the essential interests of Great Britain and Ireland, and to consolidate the strength, power and resources of the British Empire, it will be adviseable to concur in such measures as may best tend to unite the two Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland.”⁶ This act was signed in part because of an Irish uprising in 1798 which raised concerns for both the British government and Irish Protestant minority that Irish Catholics would continue to resist British rule, and that by formally uniting Ireland and Great Britain, a future revolt could be averted.

The way in which the British Empire perceived the Irish as an uncivilized people in need of reform was similar to the mindset of Russian Tsars who championed policies of “Russifying” the people of the Caucasus following the conquest of the Caucasus region. In 1801, Russian Tsar Paul I annexed the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, a former protectorate of the Russian Empire of which the Empire lost control after it was ransacked by the Iranian Shah Mohammad Khan Qajar.⁷

⁵ Kevin Kenny, *Ireland and the British Empire* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2010), 29.

⁶ “Act of Union (Ireland) 1800,” effective on January 1, 1801, <https://www.legislation.gov.uk/aip/Geo3/40/38/data.pdf>.

⁷ Thomas De Waal, *The Caucasus: An Introduction* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2019), 38.

This formal acquisition of a territory informally controlled by the Russian Empire marked the beginning of the Russian Conquest of the Caucasus, a region of land located between the Caspian Sea and Black Sea and south of the Russian Empire's western border. The Caucasus was and still is inhabited by numerous ethnic groups, and at the time of the Russian Empire's invasion, the "two largest tribal conglomerations" were the Circassians in the west and the Chechens in the east.⁸ While the people of the Caucasus and their interactions with Russia were romantically described in the works of legendary Russian authors such as Alexander Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy, the reality of the conquest was that it was a bloody conflict in which both Caucasians and Russians "carried out devastating raids on the enemy villages, plundering civilians and burning down their dwellings."⁹ Russian generals such as Aleksey Petrovich Yermolov, known as the "Iron Fist," became infamous to the Chechen people as he reportedly slaughtered entire villages and captured Chechen women to sell as wives to Russian officers.¹⁰ Yermolov, like many Russian generals sent to conquer the Caucasus, "set himself the aim of destroying any non-Russian nationality in the country" and used any means necessary to subjugate the Chechens.¹¹ The Russian Empire's invasion of the Caucasus met with heavy resistance, leading to legendary fighters such as Imam Shamil spending decades fighting against the Russian Empire, but the majority of the resistance against the empire ended in 1864.¹² The decades following the completion of the conquest of the Caucasus saw the Russian Empire

⁸ Brian Glyn Williams, *Inferno in Chechnya: the Russian-Chechen Wars, the Al Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings* (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge, 2015), 9.

⁹ Jane Burbank, Von Mark Hagen, and A. V. Remnev, *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700-1930* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 241.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹¹ Moshe Gammer, *Muslim Resistance to the Tsar: Shamil and the Conquest of Chechnia and Daghestan* (Taylor and Francis, 2013), 30.

¹² Michael A. Reynolds, *Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires, 1908-1918* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 25.

attempt the “cultural, linguistic, and religious russification of the Muslim population” of the entirety of the Caucasus.¹³

Revolutions, Famine, and Genocide

The aftermath of the conquest and formal seizure of Irish and Chechen lands by both the British Empire and Russian Empire in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were a period of attempts at independence by Irish and Chechens. While the Russian conquest of the Caucasus saw a region losing its independence in the early nineteenth century, this same period saw a rise in an increased desire for Irish independence and autonomy. Daniel O’Connell, an Irish politician in support of independence, helped secure the Roman Catholic Relief Act of 1829, which did away with many of the penal laws that restricted Catholics in Ireland. The Irish Famine of the 1840s had a significant impact on the Irish nationalist movement, as the famine was “proof of the moral bankruptcy of that Union and hence the necessity of Irish autonomy or independence.”¹⁴ Irish proponents of independence perceived this as evidence of the British’s malevolent intentions due to the “‘forced exports’ of grain and other food from Ireland during the famine years, the mass evictions or clearances”¹⁵ There is debate as to whether the Irish famine was an act of intentional genocide by the British government, but many Irish nationalists considered the tragedy as such, and that perception of genocide worsened the already strained relationship between England and Ireland.¹⁶ Angry at Britain’s mismanagement of the famine, William Smith O’Brien fought to repeal the Act of Union to secure an independent Ireland but ultimately was unable to make any

¹³ Ulrich Hofmeister, “Civilization and Russification in Tsarist Central Asia, 1860–1917,” *Journal of World History* 27, no. 3 (2016): pp. 411-442.

¹⁴ James Kelly, *Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 3, 1730-1880* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 639.

¹⁵ James S. Donnelly, “The Construction of the Memory of the Famine in Ireland and the Irish Diaspora, 1850–1900,” *Éire-Ireland* 31, no. 1-2 (1996): pp. 26-61, 38.

¹⁶ Maurice Coakley, *Ireland in the World Order a History of Uneven Development* (London, U.K.: Pluto Press, 2012), 121.

real legal progress. This led to a rebellion by the Young Ireland movement in which 100 confederates fought with 40 policemen on July 29, 1848 in Ballingarry.¹⁷ While this rebellion was swiftly put down, British opinion of Ireland continued to deteriorate as them of being undeserving of assistance from the government.¹⁸

The decades that followed the Irish Potato Famine saw an increase in support of home rule, a self-governed Ireland still part of the United Kingdom, by Irish nationalists. After two failed attempts, the third Home Rule Bill was introduced to Parliament in April 1912, and after two years of debate, the Government of Ireland Act was passed in 1914 which would have allowed Ireland self-governance in the United Kingdom. However, the bill was postponed due to the outbreak of the First World War and ultimately was never put into effect. While the bill was not implemented, its mere passing "led to the formation of and arming of a Unionist paramilitary force of as many as 100,000 men... led by a former British general and an officer corps consisting of many former military and respectable professional men."¹⁹ This Protestant militia, deemed the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), vehemently opposed the Home Rule movement and wished for Ireland to remain part of the United Kingdom and its government. While the outbreak of the First World War prevented an initial onset of violence from the UVF, the formation of a Protestant militia opposed to Irish independence prompted Irish Catholics in favor of home rule to also form a militia force, known as the Irish Volunteer Force. The First World War was a powerful motivator for the Irish Volunteer Force, as "a distracted Britain, a powerful German ally, and the promise of weapons, military assistance and diplomatic support practically obliged

¹⁷ Paul Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity, 1789-2006* (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2013), 227.

¹⁸ Kelly, *Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 3*, 656.

¹⁹ James Dingley, *The IRA the Irish Republican Army* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2012), 3.

Irish revolutionaries to rise.”²⁰ The formation of this militia escalated tensions between Protestants and Catholics in Ireland and eventually led to the Easter Rising, a week-long conflict in which 1,000 of the Irish Volunteer Force occupied the General Post Office in Dublin and fought against 20,000 British soldiers.²¹ By April 29, 1916, the rising was over, Dublin was in ruins, and 500 people (mostly civilians) were dead. Sixteen leaders of the insurrection were executed after the Easter Rising, rendering them martyrs in the eyes of Irish nationalists and further promoting the cause of Irish political independence. The outrage over the executions allowed the Sinn Fein political party to win 73 seats in Parliament, who in January 1919, established the Parliament of the Irish Public and wrote a Declaration of Independence.²² From 1918 to 1919, members of the newly formed Irish Republican Army targeted policemen and members of the Royal Irish Constabulary, and on January 21, 1919, Sinn Fein declared independence from the United Kingdom. The conflict ended in 1921 with the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, which partitioned Ireland into the Irish Republic, independent from British Rule, and Northern Ireland, still under British rule. A subgroup broke off from the IRA, becoming known as the anti-Treaty IRA, which fought against the Republic of Ireland from 1922 and 1923.

At around the same time as the Irish Revolution occurred, Russia was going through its own revolution in 1917. The Russian Empire collapsed after the abdication and death of Tsar Nicholas II in 1917, and a Civil War began between the Bolshevik and Tsarist forces. Amidst this conflict, Chechens and other people of the Caucasus were able to achieve a semblance of independence with the establishment of the Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus.

²⁰ Thomas Bartlett, *Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 4, 1880 to the Present* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 263

²¹ Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity*, 375-376.

²² Bartlett, *Cambridge History of Ireland: Volume 4*, 269.

Chechens saw the chaos of the collapsing Russian Empire as an opportunity to finally break away from Russia. However, Chechens fought on all sides of the conflict, with many fighting for their newly independent republic, while “Russified Chechen lowlanders join[ed] the tsarist Whites and the highlanders support[ed] the Bolshevik Communists.”²³ Eventually the Tsarists lost against the Bolsheviks, leading the Soviets to focus their attention on reclaiming former imperial territory in the Caucasus. Out of the numerous territory the Soviet Union controlled, Chechens, “more than any other nation in the multiethnic USSR, actively fought against the Soviets’ attempts to remold their society.”²⁴ The importance of religion in the Chechen lifestyle stood in contradiction to the atheist worldview of Communists, and several attempts were made to either “Sovietize” the Chechens or simply remove them, as demonstrated in the Second World War.

During the Second World War Chechens were accused without evidence by Joseph Stalin of supporting Nazi Germany, and they subsequently were punished with bombings and deportation. During the war, Soviet intelligence suspected Hasan Israilov, a Chechen resistance fighter, of conducting negotiations with the Nazis, considering this “to be a serious enough threat to bomb [the Chechens] on several occasions during the conflict with the Germans.”²⁵ Further steps were taken against the Chechens in the form of Operation Chechevitsa, a military campaign in 1944 during which Soviet soldiers entered Chechen villages and deported Chechens to Siberia. The deportation process included packing Chechens into train carts so tightly that many suffocated to death during the two- to three-week journey, a journey in which the deportees had no access to food, water, or place to relieve themselves.²⁶ The systematic removal of the Chechen people

²³ Williams, *Inferno in Chechnya*, 37.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 41.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 60

from their homeland was an act of mass killing that constituted as an act of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Chechens would eventually return to their homeland in 1956 after Nikita Khrushchev “cleared them of the false charges of collective treason”, but their forceful removal by the Soviet Union only enhanced a sense of nationalism and desire for independence that was brought to fruition by the collapse of the Soviet Union.²⁷

The Violence of the IRA and Chechen Insurgency

The Troubles were a period of conflict between Irish nationalists, Ulster loyalists, and British security forces over the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Irish nationalists wanted Northern Ireland to leave the U.K. and join the Republic of Ireland, while Ulster nationalists wanted Northern Ireland to remain in the U.K.²⁸ While Northern Ireland was predominantly Protestant, the Catholic minority faced unequal treatment in the forms of “housing, job, and electoral practice discrimination” which led to a series of movements and protests throughout Northern Ireland with activists demanding equal treatment.²⁹ These movements orchestrated by Catholic nationalist met heavy resistance from Protestant loyalists and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, oftentimes resulting in riots and violent conflict. The worst of these events was the Battle of Bogside, a three-day riot in Londonderry which left hundreds of Catholics, Protestants, and policemen injured, compelling the British government sent soldiers to quell the violence in Northern Ireland.³⁰ The British soldiers in Northern Ireland were granted the authority to intern without trial, and hundreds of Irish nationalists were arrested without

²⁷ Ibid., 77.

²⁸ Marie-Therese Fay, Mike Morrissey, and Marie Smyth, *Northern Ireland's Troubles: The Human Costs* (London, UNITED KINGDOM: Pluto Press, 1999), 24.

²⁹ Lorenzo Bosi, *The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social Movements* (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press, 2017), 18.

³⁰ Bew, *Ireland: The Politics of Enmity*, 465.

charge or trial.³¹ This policy led to anti-internment rallies, with one that occurred on January 30, 1972 and ended with British soldiers shooting 26 protesters after members of the crowd began to throw rocks at the soldiers. This event, known as Bloody Sunday, resulted in 13 civilian deaths, which only served to bolster the IRA's numbers and determination to continue to fight against the perceived British occupying force.³² The Troubles continued until 1998, and while most of the violence took place in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republican Army often bombed areas in England in the hopes of forcing the British government to comply with IRA demands to withdraw from Northern Ireland.³³

On April 10, 1998, the Good Friday Agreement was signed between the United Kingdom, Ireland, and several political parties of Northern Ireland, marking an end to most of the violence caused during the Troubles.³⁴ However, four months after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, a car bombing took place in Omagh, killing almost 30 people and injuring hundreds. The group responsible was the Real Irish Republican Army, a splinter group of the Provisional IRA which was "unhappy with the peace process and the decision of Sinn Fein to sign up to the Mitchell Principles on democracy and non-violence."³⁵ What little public support this iteration of the IRA had evaporated after the Omagh bombing, causing the Real IRA to call a temporary ceasefire to regroup and decide on a new strategy of armed conflict. When the group returned, its new campaign of violence focused on "the targeting of strategic and symbolic sites in England" such as the BBC Television Centre, Hammersmith Bridge, and Ealin Broadway

³¹ Bosi, *The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Movements*, 131.

³² Patrick Hayes and Jim Campbell, *Bloody Sunday: Trauma, Pain & Politics* (London: Pluto Press, 2005): 19.

³³ Fay, *Northern Ireland's Troubles*, 11.

³⁴ Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth, *Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement: Victims, Grievance and Blame* (London: Pluto, 2002), 7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

Station.³⁶ Attacks against civilians were rarer, and the number of casualties in Real IRA attacks never reached the amount seen after the Omagh bombing. One such attack took place on August 2, 2002, when a 51-year-old construction worker was killed when the Real IRA planted an explosive device at an army base in Londonderry.³⁷ The legacy of the Real IRA continues in the form of the New IRA after the group merged with the Republican Action Against Drugs in July 2012.³⁸

After the Soviet Union fell in 1991, Chechnya, which was a province of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, declared itself independent as the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Because Chechnya was not its own Soviet Republic, the newly formed Russian Federation saw Chechnya still as part of Russia and did not recognize its independence, leading to Russia invading Chechnya in 1994 to retake the region.³⁹ This was the first largescale military conflict between Russians and Chechens since the conquest of the Caucasus, with the end result being the Chechens pushing the Russians out of Chechnya in 1996. This conflict restarted again in August 1999, when a group of Chechen militants led by Shamil Basayev invaded Dagestan, a Republic of Russia located in the Northern Caucasus west of the Caspian Sea, to support the Islamist separatists fighting in the region.⁴⁰ While Russian forces pushed back the militants by the next month, the War of Dagestan, as well as a series of separatist-orchestrated apartment bombings in Russia that occurred during the invasion, served as the catalyst for the second armed conflict

³⁶ John Morrison, "Reality Check: The Real IRA's Tactical Adaptation and Restraint in the Aftermath of the Omagh Bombing," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 14, no. 6 (2020): 158.

³⁷ "Real IRA Blamed as Bomb Kills Civilian at Territorial Army Base," *The Guardian* (Guardian News and Media, August 2, 2002), <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2002/aug/02/northernireland.rosiecowan>.

³⁸ John F. Morrison, "Fighting talk: the statements of 'The IRA/New IRA'," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 28, no. 3 (2016): 599.

³⁹ James Hughes, *Chechnya from Nationalism to Jihad* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 31.

⁴⁰ Brian Glyn Williams, *Inferno in Chechnya: the Russian-Chechen Wars, the Al Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings* (Lebanon, NH: ForeEdge, 2015), 134.

between Chechnya and Russia.⁴¹ During this conflict, most of the large-scale battles took place in Chechnya until the reestablishment of Russian direct rule over the region in May 2000.⁴² Unable to fight the Russian military in direct battles, the Chechen rebels began to engage in guerrilla warfare against the reestablished pro-Russian government. This new insurgency phase of the conflict also saw an increase in bombings and hostage-takings carried out by Chechen insurgents as they began to target areas outside of Chechnya in Russia, with the goal of these attacks being to pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin into declaring a ceasefire and recognizing Chechen independence. The tactics the insurgents used in these attacks included “suicide bombings, remotely detonated bombs and seizure of hostages.”⁴³ Bombings were so common in Russia during the early 2000s that “they often [drew] little mention in the Russian press;” only when there were large numbers of civilian casualties did attacks draw significant attention from the media.⁴⁴ While suicide and remotely detonated bombings were more frequent than seizure of hostages, hostage-taking often resulted in more casualties, and thus, drew the most attention from Russian and international media. Despite the numerous acts of violence against civilians caused by Chechen rebels in the 2000s, Russia maintained its grip over Chechnya and announced in April 2009 that it would cease military operations in Chechnya later that year, signaling an end to the armed conflict in Chechnya.⁴⁵

The most infamous attacks by Chechen fighters against Russian civilians were the Moscow theater crisis in 2002 and the Beslan school siege in 2004. Regarding the former incident, on

⁴¹ Ibid., 143.

⁴² Craig Douglas Albert, Mark Freitag, and Christopher Porde, “Remember the Chechens: A Process-Tracing Analysis of the Evolution of Chechen Terrorism,” *Iran and the Caucasus* 24, no. 1 (2020): 71-91. 85.

⁴³ Mark Kramer, “Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus: The Military Dimension of the Russian–Chechen Conflict,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 57, no. 2 (2005): 209-290, 216.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 216.

⁴⁵ Michael Schwartz, “Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya,” *The New York Times* (The New York Times, April 16, 2009), <https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/europe/17chechnya.html>.

October 23, 2002, Movsar Barayev led a group of Chechen insurgents to the Dubrovka theater in Moscow and took 900 people hostage. The subsequent confrontation between Chechen fighters and Russian special forces resulted in the deaths of 200 hostages, with the special forces being “responsible for the deaths of all but three of the hostages.”⁴⁶ This tragedy was the first event that brought Russo-Chechen conflict to the awareness of a Western audience, an awareness that was amplified by the Beslan hostage crisis. On September 1, 2004, a group of Chechen, Ingush, and Arab fighters took 1,300 hostages in a school in Beslan, North Ossetia, which resulted in the deaths of all the Chechen combatants, “eleven Russian soldiers, and 344 children and parents.”⁴⁷ Similar to the Moscow theater crisis, Russian forces were responsible for most of the deaths when they collapsed a burning roof on top of the hostages. During this attack, President Putin attempted to link the “hostage crisis to America’s separate war on terror against bin Laden’s Al Qaeda” by claiming the perpetrators were “Arabs and Muslim negroes” associated with al-Qaeda.⁴⁸ This attempt to associate Chechen rebels with al-Qaeda was not uncommon for Putin, as he was eager to manipulate the United States into perceiving the insurgents as a common foe of Russia and the U.S.

The organization and actions of the IRA and Chechen fighters, as well as the broader history of the Anglo-Irish and Russo-Chechen conflicts, bear several similarities that warrant a cross-comparison of the two groups. However, the groups are not mirror images of one another, as members of the IRA were predominantly Catholic whereas members of the Chechen insurgency were predominantly Muslim. In addition, Ireland being part of the West and Chechnya being located between Europe and Asia may influence the ways in which these conflicts were

⁴⁶ Williams, *Inferno in Chechnya*, 186.

⁴⁷ Irina Mukhina, “Islamic Terrorism and the Question of National Liberation, or Problems of Contemporary Chechen Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 28, no. 6 (2005): 515-532, 524.

⁴⁸ Williams, *Inferno in Chechnya*, 192.

perceived. Despite these differences, a comparison of how media networks described the IRA and Chechen insurgency will demonstrate how acts of violence external to the Anglo-Irish and Russo-Chechen conflicts influenced the labels assigned to IRA members and Chechen fighters.

Methods

In order to understand the impact acts of violence had on the perception of the IRA and Chechen insurgency, we must analyze the rhetoric and language found in newspapers and media articles. I utilized the *New York Times* and International Newsstream databases found within the ProQuest Historical Newspapers digital archive and analyzed the shift in language used in articles to describe the Chechen insurgency and the Irish Republican Army. According to internal data from 2018, 27% of the *New York Times*' audience is from abroad, with 16% of subscribers coming from other countries.⁴⁹ To supplement the data found from the *New York Times* further, I used the International Newsstream database, which contains news articles from more than 660 newspapers from across the world, including the British Broadcasting Company, El Norte, the Jerusalem Post, and the Asian Wall Street Journal.

I conducted two searches into the database: a general search to determine the percentage of articles about the conflicts in Chechnya and Northern Ireland that use certain words such as 'terrorist' or 'separatist', and a more specific search to assess how frequently those words were used to describe Chechen insurgents and members of the IRA. My first search into the *New York Times* and International Newsstream databases examined articles that contained the phrases "Chechen War" or "Irish Republican Army" and were published between 1998 and 2009. These years were chosen because they encompass the entirety of the armed conflict between Russia and

⁴⁹ "New York Times Journalism Is Read in Every Country on Earth," The New York Times Company, November 2, 2018, <https://www.nytc.com/press/new-york-times-journalism-is-read-in-every-country-on-earth/>.

Chechnya from 1999 to 2009. In addition, it includes the Omagh bombing of 1998 and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in the same year. After doing a basic search of *New York Times* articles that contained the phrase “Chechen War” or “Irish Republican Army,” I began to add keywords to my search using the ‘AND’ Boolean operator. The key words and phrases I was examining were any derived forms of the words ‘terrorist,’ ‘separatist,’ ‘extremist,’ ‘militant,’ ‘rebel,’ and ‘nationalist.’ To ensure derivations of the words appeared in my searches, I shortened the words and included an asterisk at the end when I entered my search into the archive. For example, by typing “Irish Republican Army AND terror*” into the search bar, articles that contained both “Irish Republican Army” and ‘terror,’ ‘terrorist,’ or ‘terrorism’ were included in the results. The shortened form of the words used in these searches were ‘terror*’, ‘separat*’, ‘extrem*’, ‘militant*’, ‘rebel*’, and ‘nationalist*’. After conducting these searches, I created twelve percentage stacked columns to display the percentage of articles that contain each key word for every year for both IRA and Chechen War articles in the *New York Times* and International Newstream databases.

My second search into the *New York Times* and International Newstream databases examined every *New York Times* and international article written that contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army” or “Chechen War” published between two months before and two months after certain events. These events include the Omagh bombing on August 15, 1998, the beginning of the Moscow apartment bombings on September 4, 1999, the attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the Londonderry bombing on August 1, 2002, and the Moscow hostage crisis on October 23, 2002. I read every article published within that four-month timeframe that contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army” or “Chechen War” and recorded every time any derived form of the words ‘terrorist,’ ‘separatist,’ ‘extremist,’ ‘militant,’

‘rebel,’ and ‘nationalist’ were used to describe Chechen insurgents and IRA members. I then conducted a one-way analysis of variance test (ANOVA) to determine if there was a significant change in the usage of certain words before and after a given event. An ANOVA test is a mathematical formula used to calculate if there are statistically significant differences between the means of different samples. For this study, we are comparing the mean number of times a certain word is used in news articles before a certain event with the mean number of times that same word is used in articles after the same event. An ANOVA produces a p-value, which is the probability of obtaining results that appear significant when they are actually statistically insignificant. For a p-value to be considered significant, it typically must be less than .05, meaning there is less than a 5% chance that the results appear significant when they are actually insignificant. For the purposes of our study, however, we will also note trends with p-values that are less than .2, as this will provide further insights as to the ways in which certain events do or do not shape language used in media articles. A total of twelve ANOVA tests were conducted, based on the sets of data from the *New York Times* and International Newsstream. Regarding the articles the mentioned “Irish Republican Army,” I examined articles published two months before and after the Omagh bombing on August 15, 1998, the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, and the Londonderry bombing on August 1, 2002. Regarding articles that mention “Chechen War,” I examined articles published two months before and after the beginning of the Moscow apartment bombings on September 4, 1999, the World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001, and the Moscow hostage crisis that began on October 23, 2002. For our tests, there were six dependent variables, them being the number of times ‘terrorist,’ ‘separatist,’ ‘extremist,’ ‘militant,’ ‘rebel,’ or ‘nationalist’ are mentioned in an article. The independent variable was whether an article was written before or after a given event. If a p-

value was considered statistically significant, I then looked at the means of the values before and after the event to determine if the p-value was statistically significant in either a positive or negative direction.

Results

Articles Published Between 1998 and 2009 (New York Times)

Between 1998 and 2009 1,159 articles were published in the *New York Times* that used the term “Chechen War,” and 1,167 articles were published in the same timespan that used the term “Irish Republican Army.” The following figure showcases the usage of keywords compared to the rest of the *New York Times* articles that mention either “Irish Republican Army” or “Chechen War” as percentages.




Figure 1: Percentage stacked column charts showing the change in percent usage of certain words in “Chechen War” and “Irish Republican Army” articles published by the New York Times between 1998 and 2009.

Regarding usage of the word ‘terrorist’ in articles that mention “Irish Republican Army,” the percentages range from 26.67% in 2008 to 45.16% in 2006, with an average percent of 33.91%. While there were some increases and decreases, they were not significant enough to display any discernable histogram pattern. In contrast, there are some significant results

displayed in the usage of 'terrorist' in articles that mention "Chechen War." For example, Chechen fighters were described as terrorists an average of 38.7% and of the time prior to 2002. From 2001 to 2002, the percentage rose from 29.44% to 51.49%, continuing to rise until it peaked at 77.97% in 2006. An explanation for this shift in language from 2001 to 2002 is that after 9/11, the idea of Islamic militants was on the mind of the media. Chechen fighters being predominantly Muslim, would be associated with al-Qaeda, meaning they would be described as terrorists more often after 9/11.

This discrepancy in word frequency is found with usage of the word 'separatist' as well. Regarding the IRA, *New York Times* authors described them as separatists roughly 13.3% of the time, with the peak being 19.15% in 2007 and the low being 3.33% in 2008. In contrast, the usage of separatist in articles that contain the phrase "Chechen War" hovered around 23.07% from 1998 to 2001 before increasing to 37.93% in 2002 and continuing to increase, peaking at 50.85% in 2005. Regarding usage of 'extremist,' the average for articles that mention "Irish Republican Army" was 9.86% while the usage of articles that mention "Chechen War" was 14.9%. While there were slight increases and decreases for both types of articles, none of these changes were drastic or appeared significant. Regarding usage of the word 'militant,' the number of articles that mention "Irish Republican Army" maintained a relatively low percentage with minimal increases and decreases. For usage of the word 'militant' in "Chechen War" articles, there was a sharp increase from 3.33% in 1998 to 45.85% in 1999. This increase is likely due to the start of the Russian invasion of Chechnya in that year. Because the Republic of Chechnya was not in an active conflict prior to 1999, it is unlikely that its soldiers would have been described as militants since they were not engaged in fighting. While there was consistent usage of the word 'rebel' in both types of articles, it should be noted that 'rebel' was more often used to

describe Chechen fighters than the IRA, as half of the years showcased Chechen fighters being described as rebels at least 50% of the time. This suggests that *New York Times* authors saw Chechens as people resisting a government or occupational force. Finally, there were minimal uses of the word ‘nationalist’ in both articles, though it appears that articles that mentioned “Irish Republican Army” had a slightly higher percentage of ‘nationalist’ articles compared to articles that mention “Chechen War.”

Articles Published Between 1998 and 2009 (International Newsstream)

Regarding international newspapers published between 1998 and 2009, 6,005 articles contained the phrase “Chechen War” and 4,835 articles contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army.” The following figure showcases the usage of keywords compared to the rest of the international articles that mention either “Irish Republican Army” or “Chechen War” as percentages.




Figure 2: Percentage stacked column charts showing the change in percent usage of certain words in “Chechen War” and “Irish Republican Army” articles published by international newspapers between 1998 and 2009

Regarding percentage usage of terrorism, “Irish Republican Army” articles begin with a high percentage of 40% before decreasing throughout the timeline of interest. In contrast, the

percentage of “Chechen War” articles that contain terrorism steadily increases after 1998 before peaking in 2004 at 51.03. Regarding percentage use of ‘separatist,’ “Irish Republican Army” articles remained consistently below 5% while IRA articles steadily increased from 2.61% in 1998 to a peak of 20% in 2004 after steadily decreasing to 10.74% in 2009. No significance can be derived from the ‘extremist’ and ‘militant’ percentage stacked columns as the percentages were too low, though it can be said that those two words were used slightly more in “Chechen War” articles than “Irish Republican Army” articles. Apart from the ‘rebel’ chart, all keywords follow a similar pattern to that of Figure 1, meaning that the increases and decreases between years follow a similar pattern between international and *New York Times* authors. “Chechen War” articles saw an increase in usage of the term ‘terrorism’ after 2001 whereas “Irish Republican Army” articles saw a decrease in usage of ‘terrorist’ after 1998. “Chechen War” articles saw a gradual increase in usage of the word ‘separatist’ throughout the timeline whereas IRA members were rarely described as separatists. “Chechen War” articles were slightly more likely to contain ‘extremist’ or ‘militant’ than “Irish Republican Army” articles, albeit the percentages were not that high. “Chechen War” articles were significantly more likely to contain the word ‘rebel’ than “Irish Republican Army” articles, with the peak usage being 50.13% in 2004 while “Irish Republican Army” articles never reached above 5%. The key difference, however, is in the actual percentages. For example, while both international and *New York Times* articles saw an increase in percent usage of the word ‘terrorist’ in “Chechen War” articles, the peak percentage for international authors is 51.03% in 2004. For *New York Times* articles, the peak percentage found also in 2004 is 75.19%, and for the other years ‘terrorist’ is used consistently over 50%.

Word Frequency Before and After International Events (New York Times)

I conducted ANOVA tests to assess if there were any significant changes before and after certain terrorist attacks. To be considered statistically significant, a p-value must be less than .05. The results are displayed below, and results less than .05 have been bolded.

ANOVA Test Results for Word Usage in <i>New York Times</i> Articles						
Key Word	IRA Articles after Omagh Bombing (6/15/1998-10/15/1998)	Chechen War Articles after Moscow Bombings (7/4/1999-11/4/1999)	IRA Articles 9/11 attacks (7/11/2001-11/11/2001)	Chechen War Articles after 9/11 attacks (7/11/2001-11/11/2001)	IRA Articles after Londonderry Bombing (6/1/2002-10/1/2002)	Chechen War Articles after Moscow Hostage Crisis (8/23/2002-12/23/2002)
Terrorist	.879	.024 (+)	.002 (+)	.031 (+)	.332	.020 (+)
Separatist	-	.002 (-)	-	.282	-	.004 (+)
Extremist	-	.855	-	.504	-	.157
Militant	-	.082	.512	.429	-	.262
Rebel	-	.039 (-)	-	.044 (-)	.237	.610
Nationalist	-	-	.953	-	.238	.214

Figure 3: ANOVA test results indicating whether there were significant changes in usage of certain words in “Irish Republican Army” and “Chechen War” articles published by the New York Times. Significant values ($p < .05$) have been bolded. Significant increasing trends have been marked with a (+) whereas insignificant decreasing trends have been marked with a (-).

Regarding word usage in *New York Times* articles that contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army” and were published two months before and after the Omagh bombing of

1998, the only p-value calculated was for usage of the word ‘terrorist’ (.879), which was statistically insignificant. Regarding the other keywords, no p-values were calculated, meaning that no *New York Times* author described the IRA as separatists, extremists, militants, rebels, or nationalists two months prior and two months after the Omagh bombing. While the p-value for usage of ‘terrorist’ was statistically insignificant, this does not mean that the *New York Times* did not describe the IRA as terrorists. The last “Irish Republican Army” article published before the Omagh bombing described the IRA as terrorists five times, and the first “Irish Republican Army” article after the attack contained a map of Ireland with Omagh highlighted couple with a caption stating: “Omagh is trying to find people still missing after the terror bombing.”⁵⁰ This indicates that *New York Times* authors were already describing the IRA as terrorists, just that the Omagh bombing did not cause a shift in their usage of that word.

Regarding word usage in *New York Times* articles that contained the phrase “Chechen War” published before and after the Moscow apartment bombings of 1999, the data indicates that there was a significant increase in usage of the word ‘terrorist’ (.024), and a significant decrease in usage of the words ‘separatist’ (.002), and ‘rebel’ (.039). There was a general but statistically insignificant decreasing trend in usage of the word ‘militant’ (.082), and usage of ‘extremist’ (.855) was not statistically significant. A p-value was not calculated for usage of ‘nationalist’ as Chechen fighters were never described as ‘nationalists’ by *New York Times* authors before or after the apartment bombings in Moscow. The increase in usage of ‘terrorist’ and decrease of ‘separatist’ and ‘rebel’ to describe Chechen fighters indicates that *New York*

⁵⁰ Sarah Lyall, "Mountbatten Bomber is Freed, Outraging Many in Britain," *New York Times*, Aug 08, 1998, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/mountbatten-bomber-is-freed-outraging-many/docview/431032647/se-2?accountid=8361>.

⁵¹ James F. Clarity, "The Day After in Ulster Town: Now 'it's Back'," *New York Times*, Aug 17, 1998, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/day-after-ulster-town-now-back/docview/431024155/se-2?accountid=8361>.

Times authors saw Chechen fighters less as freedom fighters and more as individuals willing to use terrorism to achieve their means. This is not surprising as the killing of civilians to further a political goal would increase instances of the word terrorism. In the first “Chechen War” article published after the first apartment bombing on September 4, 1999, ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ were not mentioned once, with Chechen fighters who were suspected in the attack described as ‘Islamic militants’ or ‘rebels.’⁵² Almost two weeks later, in an article about another bombing in the series of attacks, Chechen fighters were not described as rebels once and instead were regarded as terrorists, with statements such as “terrorism has been declared on the Russian people” and “what had seemed unrelated and unusual exceptions were now seen by many Russians as part of a sinister pattern of terrorism against ordinary people.”⁵³ This provides an example of the shift in language from Chechen ‘rebels’ to Chechen ‘terrorists.’

The fact that an attack caused by Chechen fighters resulted in them being more likely to be described as ‘terrorists,’ ‘separatists,’ and ‘militants’ when an attack caused by the IRA resulted in no shift in language suggests that *New York Times* authors were more willing to characterize Chechens as terrorists after they were responsible for an act of violence compared to the IRA. Two counterarguments to this point are that the Moscow hostage crisis resulted in significantly more deaths than the Omagh bombing, possibly suggesting that the more deaths an attack results in, the more likely a shift in language is to occur. Another counterargument is that the Omagh bombing took place before 9/11 whereas the Moscow hostage crisis took place after 9/11, meaning the effect seen in the Moscow hostage crisis is just an after-effect of 9/11.

⁵² Michael R. Gordon, "Rebels Attack Caucasus Area; Bomb Kills 30," *New York Times*, Sep 06, 1999, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/rebels-attack-caucasus-area-bomb-kills-30/docview/431244752/se-2?accountid=8361>.

⁵³ Michael R. Gordon, "Moscow Blast, 3d in 2 Weeks, Kills at Least 95," *New York Times*, Sep 14, 1999, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/moscow-blast-3d-2-weeks-kills-at-least-95/docview/431241827/se-2?accountid=8361>.

However, if this was the case, then 9/11 should have had a significant impact on usage of the words ‘separatist’ and ‘extremist’ just as the Moscow hostage crisis; instead it was just a positive trend.

Regarding word usage in *New York Times* articles that contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army” and were published two months before and after 9/11, the results indicate that there was significant increase in usage of ‘terrorist’ (.002) and that there was no statistically significant change in usage of the words ‘militant’ (.512) and ‘nationalist’ (.953). There were no p-values calculated for ‘separatist,’ ‘extremist,’ or ‘rebel,’ meaning no *New York Times* author described the IRA as those words two months before and two months after 9/11. The results indicate that after 9/11, there was a shift in language to describe the IRA as terrorists. This suggests that regardless of whether or not a group is directly responsible for an act of violence, that act may still cause a shift in language used to describe that group. Also, while collecting data, I noticed that a bombing orchestrated by the Real IRA took place a month before 9/11 in a West London subway station that wounded six people. *New York Times* authors described the incident as “the Real I.R.A., a dissident Irish Republican Army group opposed to Northern Ireland's 1998 peace accord, has been blamed for a series of explosions in the province and in Britain proper.”⁵⁴ The Real IRA nor the suspects of the attack were ever described as terrorists or with any of the keywords, including an article on the following day on August 4 which described the Real IRA as a “dissident Irish group opposed to efforts to forge a political situation in Ulster.”⁵⁵ This is notable as an attack on civilians using a bomb was not described as a terrorist

⁵⁴ "Blast Wounds 6 Near Subway in West London," *New York Times*, Aug 03, 2001, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/blast-wounds-6-near-subway-west-london/docview/431837613/se-2?accountid=8361>.

⁵⁵ Seth Mydans et al., "World Briefing: ASIA AFRICA EUROPE," *New York Times* Aug 04, 2001, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/world-briefing/docview/92163839/se-2?accountid=8361>.

attack by the *New York Times* prior to 9/11. In contrast, an article published nine days after 9/11 titled “The War on Terror is Not New” described the IRA as terrorists four times, stating that “some countries in Europe have been at war with terrorists for decades and they have learned some hard lessons in the process.”⁵⁶ This demonstrates the sudden shift in language international events can cause, as in an article about an act of violence organized by the IRA before 9/11 contained no mention of terrorism, whereas an article about terrorism in general published after 9/11 described the IRA as terrorists.

Regarding word usage in *New York Times* articles that contained the phrase “Chechen War” and were published two months before and after 9/11, the data indicates that there was a statistically significant increase in usage of ‘terrorist’ (.031) and a significant decrease in usage of the word ‘rebel’ (.044). The p-values of ‘separatist’ (.282), ‘extremist’ (.504), and ‘militant’ (.429) were statistically insignificant, and no p-value was calculated for ‘nationalist’ as Chechens were not described as ‘nationalists’ in *New York Times* articles published two months before and after 9/11. Usage of ‘rebel*’ (.842) was not statistically significant, and there was no p-value calculated for ‘nationalist*’ as Chechen fighters were never described as nationalists in the articles during this period. The increase in usage of ‘terrorist’ and decrease in ‘rebel’ to describe Chechen fighters indicates that the September 11th attacks changed perspective of *New York Times* authors as they now saw the Chechen War as part of the new War on Terror. Chechen ‘rebels’ had become Chechen ‘terrorists.’ Only one “Chechen War” article described Chechen fighters as terrorists, whereas one of the first articles published after 9/11 described Chechen

⁵⁶ Niall Ferguson, "The War on Terror is Not New: [Op-Ed]," *New York Times*, Sep 20, 2001, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/war-on-terror-is-not-new/docview/431859878/se-2?accountid=8361>.

fighters as terrorists twelve times.⁵⁷ Similar to the “Irish Republican Army” articles, *New York Times* authors demonstrated an increase in usage of ‘terrorist’ to describe Chechen fighters after 9/11.

Regarding word usage in *New York Times* articles that contained that phrase “Irish Republican Army” and were published two months before and after the Londonderry bombing of 2002, no statistically significant p-values were calculated for ‘terrorist’ (.332), ‘rebel’ (.237), or ‘nationalist’ (.238). In addition, no p-values were calculated for ‘separatist,’ ‘extremist,’ or ‘militant.’ The lack of significant p-values for this event is likely because only one civilian was killed during the Londonderry bombing. However, while statistically insignificant, the p-value for ‘terrorist’ for the Londonderry incident was lower than the p-value for the Omagh bombing (.879), which had significantly more deaths. A possible explanation for this is that the Londonderry bombing took place after 9/11, which had an impact on *New York Times* authors usage of the word ‘terrorist’ when describing IRA members.

Regarding word usage in *New York Times* articles that contained the phrase “Chechen War” and were published two months before and after the Moscow hostage crisis of 2002, the results indicate there was a statistically significant increase in usage of the words ‘terrorist’ (.020) and ‘separatist’ (.004). There was a general but less significant trend in usage of the word ‘extremist’ (.157), and the p-values of ‘militant’ (.262), ‘rebel’ (.610) and ‘nationalist’ (.214) were all statistically insignificant.

⁵⁷ Steven Erlanger, "THE RUSSIANS: SCHRODER URGES Milder VIEW OF MOSCOW ROLE IN CHECHNYA," *New York Times*, Sep 26, 2001, <https://www.proquest.com/historical-newspapers/russians/docview/92025157/se-2?accountid=8361>.

Word Frequency Before and After International Events (International Newsstream)

I conducted ANOVA tests to assess if there were any significant changes in language used in international articles before and after certain attacks attributed to the IRA and Chechen insurgency. To be considered statistically significant, a p-value must be less than .05. The results are displayed below in Figure 4, and results less than .05 have been bolded.

ANOVA Test Results for Word Usage in International Newsstream Articles						
Key Word	IRA Articles after Omagh Bombing (6/15/1998-10/15/1998)	Chechen War Articles after Moscow Apartment Bombings (7/4/1999-11/4/1999)	IRA Articles after 9/11 attacks (7/11/2001-11/11/2001)	Chechen War Articles after 9/11 attacks (7/11/2001-11/11/2001)	IRA Articles after Londonderry Bombing (6/1/2002-10/1/2002)	Chechen War Articles after Moscow Hostage Crisis (8/23/2002-12/23/2002)
Terrorist	.039 (+)	<.001 (+)	.141	<.001 (+)	.497	<.001 (+)
Separatist	.957	.967	.112	.341	-	.155
Extremist	.920	.407	.452	.049 (+)	-	.089
Militant	.750	.837	.822	.035 (+)	.331	.676
Rebel	.813	.004 (-)	.145	.044 (+)	.010 (+)	.806
Nationalist	.068	.574	.663	.111	.637	.148

Figure 4: ANOVA test results indicating whether there were significant changes in usage of certain words in “Irish Republican Army” and “Chechen War” articles published by international newspapers. Significant values ($p < .05$) have been bolded. Significant increasing trends have been marked with a (+) whereas insignificant decreasing trends have been marked with a (-).

Regarding word usage in international articles that contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army” and were published two months before and after the Omagh bombing of 1998, there was a significant increase in usage of ‘terror’ (.039) as well as an almost significant increasing trend of usage of the word ‘nationalist’ (.068). The p-values of ‘separatist’ (.957), ‘extremist’ (.920), ‘militant’ (.750), and ‘rebel’ (.813) were all statistically insignificant. This contrasts the data found in the *New York Times* in several ways. Firstly, the data suggests that international news authors were more likely to describe the IRA as terrorists after Omagh bombing when compared to *New York Times* authors. Another key difference in the data is that while there was a lack of statistically significant p-values for the other keywords, the fact that a p-value was calculated at all means that at least some international authors described the IRA as being separatists, extremists, militants, rebels, and nationalists. In contrast, because no p-values were calculated for those words for the *New York Times* data, no *New York Times* authors described the IRA as any of those words two months prior and two months after the Omagh bombing. This means that international authors were much more likely to describe the IRA using politically charged vocabulary when compared to *New York Times* authors. In the first article that reported on the detail of the Omagh bombing, the author stated that “three republican terrorist groups came under immediate suspicion for yesterday’s Omagh bombing” and that “IRA terrorists” were suspected of operating in splinter groups of the IRA.⁵⁸ This shows an immediate response by international authors to describe the IRA as terrorists after the Omagh bombing took place.

⁵⁸ Vikram Dodd, "Outrage in Omagh: For Republican Dissidents the Liberation War Goes on the Suspects/ Vikram Dodd Charts the most Likely Groups Behind the Bomb," *The Observer*, Aug 16, 1998, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/outrage-omagh-republican-dissidents-liberation/docview/250461121/se-2?accountid=8361>.

Regarding word usage in international articles that contained the phrase “Chechen War” and were published two months before and after the apartment bombings in Moscow in 1999, there was a highly significant increasing trend in usage of ‘terrorist’ (<.001) but a significant decreasing trend in usage of ‘rebel’ (.004). The change in frequency of the words ‘separatist’ (.967), ‘extremist’ (.407), ‘militant’ (.837) and ‘nationalist’ (.574) were all statistically insignificant. These results are similar to those found in the *New York Times* database in that after the beginning of the Moscow apartment bombings, both international and *New York Times* authors saw Chechen fighters less as rebels fighting against the Russian Federation but more as terrorists willing to use violence against civilians to achieve their goals. An article published eleven days before the first of the apartment bombings described Chechen fighters as rebels 14 times and described Shamil Basayev as a “Chechen commander.”⁵⁹ One of the first articles published after the Moscow apartment bombings described the Chechen fighters as rebels only six times, quoted the Russian government referring to the attack as “a terrorist act” and described Basayev as a “Chechen warlord.”⁶⁰ Finally, one week after the first bombing, an article titled “Russian journalist reveals details about alleged terrorist plot” described the Chechen fighters as terrorists ten times, with no mention of the other key words, including rebel.

Regarding word usage in international articles that contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army” and were published two months before and after 9/11, the results suggest a general but statistically insignificant increasing trend in usage of the ‘terrorist’ (.141) and ‘rebel’ (.145), and an also statistically insignificant decreasing trend in usage of ‘separatist’ (.122). The

⁵⁹ Alice Lagnado, "Russia Drifts into Long War in Dagestan: [1 Edition]," *The Scotsman*, Aug 24, 1999, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/russia-drifts-into-long-war-dagestan/docview/326801997/se-2?accountid=8361>.

⁶⁰ Andrew Jack, "Army Hostel Bomb Kills 22 in Dagestan: [London Edition]," *Financial Times*, Sep 06, 1999, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/army-hostel-bomb-kills-22-dagestan/docview/248334595/se-2?accountid=8361>.

p-values of ‘extremist’ (.452), ‘militant’ (.822), and ‘nationalist’ (.663) were statistically insignificant. in international articles about the IRA after 9/11. This contrasts the data found in *New York Times* database. Because an article about a bombing conducted by the Real IRA was mentioned by the IRA, I examined the same attack that was published by international authors. The first two articles about the attack did not explicitly describe the Real IRA as terrorists, but provide a comment from “Alan Fry, head of Scotland Yard’s anti-terrorist branch,” who said the attacks resembled others in the past few months.⁶¹⁶² The statement of ‘anti-terrorist’ implies that the incident was a terrorist attack. The British newspaper *Mail on Sunday* described the Real IRA as terrorists seven times, stating that “the terrorist cell is believed to be behind seven bombings in London in the last few years.”⁶³ This shows that even before 9/11, international authors were already describing the IRA as terrorists.

Regarding word usage in international articles that contained the phrase “Chechen War” and were published two months before and after 9/11, the results show that there was a significant increase in usage of ‘terrorist’ (<.001), ‘extremist’ (.049) ‘militant’ (.035), and ‘rebel’ (.044). There was a less significant but still positive trend in usage of ‘nationalist’ (.111) and there was no statistically significant p-value for usage of ‘separatist’ (.341). When compared to the *New York Times*, the data is similar in that both databases indicate a highly significant change in usage of ‘terrorist’ to describe Chechen insurgents after 9/11. However, they differ in that

⁶¹ "West London's Massive Car Bomb Wounds Seven," *China Daily*, Aug 04, 2001, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/west-londons-massive-car-bomb-wounds-seven/docview/257748454/se-2?accountid=8361>.

⁶² "Seven Injured as Car Bomb Blasts London: [1 Edition]," *The Mercury*, Aug 04, 2001, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/seven-injured-as-car-bomb-blasts-london/docview/353391857/se-2?accountid=8361>.

⁶³ "Security Forces 'Know Who the Bomber is' Says IRA Informant Gang Behind New Terror Campaign has Links Throughout the World: [FB Edition]," *Mail on Sunday*, Aug 05, 2001, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/security-forces-know-who-bomber-is-says-ira/docview/328745227/se-2?accountid=8361>.

international articles also saw a significant increase in describing Chechen fighters as ‘extremists,’ ‘militants,’ and ‘rebels.’ Notably, the p-values for changes in use of ‘rebel’ to describe Chechen fighters before and after 9/11 is the same for both *New York Times* and international articles, however the direction of the value is different. Furthermore, when examining “Chechen War” articles before and after the Moscow apartment bombings, both *New York Times* and international articles saw an increase in usage of ‘terrorist’ and decrease in usage of ‘rebel’ to describe Chechen fighters, meaning one could argue that both types of authors saw Chechen fighters more as violent terrorists willing to use political violence against civilians rather than as rebels trying to achieve independence for their homeland. However, because three other keywords in addition to ‘terrorist’ saw an increase in usage to describe Chechen fighters in international articles after 9/11, it may mean that international authors were just using more politically charged terms to describe Chechen fighters rather than they saw them more as terrorists.

Regarding word usage in international articles that contained the phrase “Irish Republican Army” and were published two months before and after the Londonderry bombing of 2002, there was a significant increase in usage of the ‘rebel’ (.010) to describe IRA members. The p-values for ‘terrorist’ (.497), ‘militant’ (.331), and ‘nationalist’ (.637) were all statistically insignificant, and no p-values were calculated for ‘separatist’ or ‘extremist’ as those words were never used to describe IRA members in the designated timeframe. The lack of a significant p-value for ‘terrorist’ is likely due to the lack of high civilian casualties in the Londonderry bombing, as well as because international news authors already saw the IRA and its various chapters as terrorists. As to why there was a significant increase in usage of ‘rebel’ to describe the IRA after the Londonderry bombing, of the 72 articles before the bombing, not a single one

described the IRA as rebels. Of the 33 articles published after the bombing, three described the IRA as rebels once each, but upon reading each article, most used the term in the context of the past. For example, one article explaining the history of Northern Ireland stated that that “a small group of Irish rebels took control of parts of Dublin” during the Easter rising of 1916, and another described the IRA as a “rebel organization” in the context of article about the history of the Troubles.⁶⁴⁶⁵

Regarding international articles that contain the phrase “Chechen War” and were published two months before and after the Moscow hostage crisis of 2002, there was a significant increase in usage of the word ‘terrorist’ (<.001) and a general but insignificant increasing trend regarding ‘separatist’ (.155), ‘extremist’ (.089), and ‘nationalist’ (.148). The p-values of ‘militant’ (.676) and ‘rebel’ (.806) were statistically insignificant. It could be argued that because there was a general increasing trend in usage of ‘separatist,’ ‘extremist,’ and ‘nationalist’ to describe Chechen fighters that international authors were only using politically charged language after 9/11 rather than seeing Chechen fighters as terrorists, similar to the argument made about Chechen War articles after 9/11. However, the p-values for the three other words in this case are just trends and not statistically significant, making this argument less compelling.

In summary, both international and *New York Times* articles saw an increase in usage of the word ‘terrorist’ to describe Chechen fighters after the beginning of the Moscow apartment bombings in 1999, the September 11 attacks of 2001, and the Moscow hostage crisis of 2002.

⁶⁴ "Where did it Come from?" Belfast Telegraph, Sep 17, 2002, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/where-did-come/docview/337130852/se-2?accountid=8361>.

⁶⁵ Bruce Wilson, "New IRA History Links Gerry Adams to Murder Squad: [1 - STATE Edition]," *The Advertiser*, Oct 01, 2002, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/new-ira-history-links-gerry-adams-murder-squad/docview/355771384/se-2?accountid=8361>.

Regarding the IRA, international authors increased their usage of ‘terrorist’ to describe the IRA after the Omagh bombing while also displaying an increasing but statistically insignificant trend to describe the IRA as terrorists after 9/11. In contrast, the *New York Times* only increased their usage of ‘terrorist’ to describe the IRA after 9/11 rather than after the Omagh or Londonderry bombings. This demonstrates that 9/11, an act external to the Anglo-Irish and Russo-Chechen conflicts, influenced the labels media networks used to describe the IRA and Chechen insurgency.

The Implications of the ‘Terrorist’ Label

The findings of this study indicate that 9/11 caused a shift in the *New York Times* and international authors’ use of certain keywords to describe the IRA and Chechen fighters, supporting my argument that acts of violence not connected with the events in Northern Ireland or Chechnya shaped the description of events and parties in both conflict areas. Chechens fighting for liberation from Russian occupation became Chechen terrorists, and the IRA who were often described in neutral terms became seen as terrorists. As to how this relates to pre-existing literature, scholars studying the salience of certain terrorist and security topics in news stories concluded that “how media portray different security risks is dependent on...past experience with a particular security threat, as well as probability of the country being targeted in the future.”⁶⁶ This explains why the *New York Times* in particular became more willing to describe the IRA and Chechen fighters as terrorists after 9/11. Other scholars studying the effect 9/11 had on media discourse found that after the attack on the World Trade Center, international

⁶⁶ Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldova, “Perception of Terrorism and Security and the Role of Media,” In *The 7th ECPR General Conference*, Section, vol. 55 (Colchester: ECPR 2013), 23.

media tended to “negatively depict Islam by associating it with terrorism.”⁶⁷ This helps to explain our findings regarding Chechen insurgents; Chechen rebels were predominantly Muslim, so it stands to reason that an increased association between Islam and terrorism in media following 9/11 would result in the rebels being characterized as terrorists in media stories.

My results indicate that 9/11 influenced the labels Chechen fighters were assigned by *New York Times* and international authors and the labels the IRA were assigned by the *New York Times*, and less significantly, international authors in general. The importance of these findings is that labels such as ‘terrorist’ and ‘rebel’ carry connotations that influence the ways in which a person perceives a group assigned those labels. This perception in turn can play a role in international policy, cooperation, and decision-making. In his book *Language Wars*, Jeff Lewis comments on the political nature of terrorism by stating that “the label of ‘terrorist’ is used by adversaries in a violent conflict to demonize their enemies.”⁶⁸ Labelling something as ‘terrorism’ causes whatever and whomever to lose its moral credibility and public support, making it harder for the labelled ‘terrorist’ group to achieve their political goals. The consequences of being labelled as ‘terrorist’ is why the IRA “refer to themselves as an ‘army’ which is fighting a ‘civil war’ against an imperial force” and why “for the British authorities... the IRA’s attacks on noncombatants and their sub-national status condemn them as ‘terrorists.’”⁶⁹ When the IRA are described in news media as terrorists, this hurts their credibility as they are seen as violent actors preying on innocent civilians rather than as soldiers fighting for a lost cause against a tyrannical regime. That is why the IRA’s reputation suffers when international authors describe the IRA as terrorists after the Omagh bombing, and *New York Times* authors after 9/11. A few days after the

⁶⁷ Sofia Hayati Yusof, Fauziah Hassan, Salleh Hassan, and Mohd Nizam Osman, "The Framing of International Media on Islam and Terrorism," *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 8 (2013), 104.

⁶⁸ Lewis, *Language Wars*, 53.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 23.

Omagh bombing, the Real IRA both claimed responsibility and apologized for the attack, with a spokesperson stating that “despite media reports it was not our intention at any time to kill any civilians. It was a commercial target, part of the on-going war against Brits. We offer apologies to the civilians.”⁷⁰ By claiming the attack was an operation in an “on-going war” the Real IRA representative was attempting to legitimize the bombing, an attempt soundly rejected by the British public. It should be noted though, that no such apology was issued for the sole victim of the Londonderry bombing of 2002. While this could be explained that the Real IRA did not feel the need to issue an apology for an attack which resulted in a single casualty, it can also be assumed that because there was not a significant media outcry which resulted in the IRA being described more often as terrorists, there was no need for a spokesperson to issue a statement in order to “save” their reputation.

The label of terrorism is not just a way in which independent media networks describe political violence in the news; it is a tool that governments can use to influence rhetoric and perception regarding foreign policy to place themselves in a more advantageous position. Vladimir Putin demonstrated this tactic during second largescale conflict between the Russian Federation and Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in the 1990s and 2000s. Putin purposefully connotated “Chechen self-determination with Islamic fundamentalist terror” to at first avoid the complex issue of Chechen independence, but then to coax the U.S. into perceiving Chechen fighters as enemies in War on Terror after 9/11.⁷¹ Putin and his administration aimed to use the label of ‘terrorist’ as a means to fulfill their domestic and international political goals, namely to

⁷⁰ "UK Government Condemns Real IRA's Mass Murder Apology." Xinhua News Agency - CEIS, Aug 18, 1998, <https://www.proquest.com/wire-feeds/uk-government-condemns-real-iras-mass-murder/docview/453961139/sc-2?accountid=8361>.

⁷¹ John Russell, “Terrorists, Bandits, Spooks and Thieves: Russian Demonisation of the Chechens before and since 9/11,” *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 1 (2005): 101-116, 114.

draw attention away from Russia human rights abuses in Chechnya and have both Russian citizens and the West focus more on the acts of violence inflicted upon civilians. Given that both international and *New York Times* articles had a significant increasing trend in usage of the word ‘terrorist’ to describe Chechen fighters after 9/11, the results indicate that Putin succeeded; both the international media system and one of the United States’ most respected newspapers began to characterize the Chechen fighters as terrorists after 9/11. This is not to say the labeling of Chechen insurgents as terrorists by Western media was incorrect or immoral; the Beslan school siege, Moscow theater crisis, and numerous bombings caused by Chechen extremists were all clear examples of terrorism, so the actors who caused those tragedies should be labeled as terrorists. However, it is important to acknowledge that Putin saw an opportunity to transform the political relationship between Russia and the U.S. in the wake of the September 11, and according to the data in our study, the *New York Times* accommodated this desire, whether or not they were aware of the international political consequences. Putin recognized the United States’ newfound obsession with terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks as an opportunity to create a more favorable relationship with the U.S. and to justify Russia’s immoral actions taken during the Second Chechen War. Some international authors recognized this, as a year after 9/11 and a few weeks after the Moscow hostage crisis, an author of the New Zealand paper, *The Southland Times*, stated in an article that while the hostage crisis was an act of terrorism, the attack gave Putin the “opportunity to portray all armed Chechens as terrorists, rather than, as the great majority of Chechen troops have been, soldiers battling to free their homeland from the forcefully applied rule of a much larger state.”⁷²

⁷² "Laws for Home and Away: [1 Edition]." *The Southland Times*, Nov 12, 2002, <https://www.proquest.com/newspapers/laws-home-away/docview/330763561/se-2?accountid=8361>.

Another implication of the results is how the history of the Russian-Chechen and Anglo-Irish conflicts will be remembered. The change in language to describe the Chechen War risks discounting the immoral actions taken by the Russian government during the Chechen Wars, and the change in language to describe the IRA risks erasing the violence Ulster Loyalists and the British government inflicted upon Irish civilians during the Troubles. While it is important to recognize the violence Chechen fighters and the IRA have inflicted upon civilians, it is equally important to put those attacks in the context of Russia and Britain's military operations in Chechnya and Northern Ireland. Russian soldiers stationed in Chechnya frequently "engaged in systematic human rights abuses, including torture, rape, forced disappearances, mass arrest operations (zachistki), kidnapping and summary executions."⁷³ The Northern Irish government during the Troubles was allowed to intern those suspected of collaborating with the IRA with no charge or trial, and British soldiers used a number of torture techniques against those arrested, including waterboarding, electric shocks, sleep deprivation, and 'Falanga,' using heavy rods to beat one's feet.⁷⁴ In the context of this study, the recharacterization of Chechen fighters and the IRA as terrorists risks reframing Russia and Britain's human rights abuses as counterterrorism operations. For example, Russia displayed an ineptitude in responding to both the Moscow theater crisis and Beslan school siege. In the theater crisis, Russian special forces deployed a gas that "experts believe it was fentanyl, an extremely lethal opioid/chemical more toxic than those used in World War I," which was the main cause of death for the hostages.⁷⁵ During the Beslan school siege, Russian counterterrorism operatives launched "thermobaric incendiary devices similar to napalm" into the building which killed several hostages, with one survivor remarking

⁷³ Kramer, "Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency and Terrorism in the North Caucasus," 214.

⁷⁴ Martin J. McCleery, *Operation Demetrius and Its Aftermath: A New History of the Use of Internment without Trial in Northern Ireland, 1971 - 75* (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 2020), 67.

⁷⁵ Williams, *Inferno in Chechnya*, 186.

that “the roof began to burn when they [the Russian forces] began to fire at it with some projectiles.”⁷⁶ In both of these incidents, the majority of casualties were caused by Russian forces, but in international media, the blame was placed completely on the Chechen terrorists with little mention of how the Russians handled the crises. This is not to shift the blame from Chechens to Russians; the hostages would not have been killed by Russian forces if the Chechens had not taken them hostage. But the reporting influences in how these stories are told, and according to our data, the *New York Times* and international newspapers increasingly referred to Chechens as terrorists after 9/11. This drastic shift in language risks distorting the history of Russia’s human rights abuses in Chechnya and their mishandling of hostage crises.

This is not to say that the actions of the IRA and Chechen fighters were excusable and they should not be described as terrorists. Both groups used violence against civilians in an effort to further their political goals, so they should be described both in media and in history with labels appropriate to their actions. However, we should be aware of the impact these labels have on how the conflicts in which these groups operated in reshapes how those conflicts are seen. These labels risk reconceptualizing the Russo-Chechen and Anglo-Irish conflicts as a battle of good versus evil, which diminishes the actions taken by the British and Russian governments against the Irish and Chechen people.

Conclusion

The Irish Republican Army and Chechen fighters styled themselves fighting for their home against an oppressive regime. This highlights the importance of labels, as labels have the power to either legitimize or invalidate the causes of the IRA and Chechen insurgency. My research

⁷⁶ Ibid., 193.

into the *New York Times* and International Newsstream databases indicates that the September 11 attacks, even though it was an event that was not connected to the conflicts occurring in Northern Ireland and Chechnya, influenced the way in which media networks described and assigned labels to the Irish Republican Army and Chechen insurgency. The importance of this finding is that the shift in rhetoric and labels can influence the perception of these groups, which in turn can impact global policy decisions and how the history of certain conflicts will be remembered.

Plastic Makes Perfect: An Analysis of Plastic Surgery as Rehabilitation in Early to Late 20th Century Prison Populations

Jack West

“CRIMINALITY IS CURED,” reads a 1922 *Los Angeles Times* article describing the work of Dr. Leo Stanley, endocrinologist and chief surgeon at San Quentin State Penitentiary in California. Stanley, interested in controlling crime and the “revitalization” of man, developed his theory that murderers had overdeveloped thyroid glands and believed that he could cure his patients, whom he diagnosed as “morons, mentally dull, apathetic, and prematurely aged,” with testicular implants from executed inmates.¹ Twelve years earlier, New York Prison Commissioner Henry Solomon of Sing Sing Prison publicly announced an increased effort to release prisoners afflicted with chronic ailments if they could be treated by surgery. “Henry Solomon Says Prisoners Go Away Handicapped,” an article published in *The New York Tribune* describes a number of convicts released with “physical imperfections” that continue to hinder their success at a new life.² The story was picked up by *The New York Times* and *The Atlanta Constitution*, and then disappeared.

As early as 1910, journalists from around the United States reported on the cause-and-effect relationship between a criminal’s physical appearance, their offenses, and the plastic surgeons willing to help them. While plastic surgery can restore confidence and increase happiness, leading to a comprehensive personality shift, these surgeons were not interested in changing behavior solely to increase confidence. Rather, they were interested in changing the

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¹ Edward Boyden, “Criminality Is Cured: Startling Results at San Quentin; Executed Convicts’ Glands Implanted in Bodies of Sick Prisoners,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 11, 1922, pp. 11-12.

² “Sing Sing Report: For Better Surgery,” *New York Tribune*, January 10, 1910, p. 4.

physical “causes” of criminality to sever the mental roots of crime, inferiority, and anti-social attitudes, essentially asking “Does the mind make a criminal, or does the body?”

Organized chronologically, this paper examines the use of plastic surgery programs as reform in prison through the lens of popular newspaper and journal articles. I argue that public perception and reaction revealed in these articles shaped the prison program’s journey from its underground beginning to its eventual demise. First, I will introduce plastic surgery as a medical field, the early notions of criminology, and the relationship between the two. Next, I will trace popular early instances of plastic surgery performed on criminals and the public’s reaction. In these early stages, public reaction primarily consisted of skepticism, fear, and anxiety over a novel medical technique that could potentially “disguise” anyone, especially criminals. Next, I will consider the rise of federally funded prison surgery programs in Chicago, New York, and Texas in addition to small operations in California. When charitable or backed by data and “science,” these programs were received relatively positively and supported by the general public. I will track these programs until their eventual downfall in the 1980s primarily due to public backlash, as showcased in numerous articles complaining of these programs funded by taxpayers. Finally, I conclude with an observation of the present rehabilitative policies of American prisons and their future methods.

Early Plastic Surgery and the First Criminal Faces

From the early 1900s, medical journals and public newspapers alike published stories on advances in surgery. An article titled “Rhinoplasty” appeared in an 1840 edition of *The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal*, describing a procedure in which a portion of skin from the forearm replaced a missing piece from the nose. Instead of taking skin from the forehead, as was commonly

done at the time, this new artform, dubbed “rhinoplastic” surgery, saved the face from obvious scarring.³ The specialty of plastic surgery became more widespread in the wake of World War I as techniques like antiseptics and drugs like chloroform advanced surgery generally and as wounds became more severe and complex. Facial reconstruction was most common for soldiers and required the eyes (and hands) of very experienced doctors. British Captain Harold Gillies and a team of surgeons adapted the techniques previously used for neck and head cancer treatments to develop methods for what is now considered plastic surgery. These adaptations would later attract American surgeons to learn from the English and collaborate on the battlefields, transferring knowledge and skills across the pond.⁴

From post-war Europe and America came a gradual reworking of reconstructive surgery into cosmetic services deemed more socially acceptable in an era desiring beauty and youth. European surgeons Jacques Maliniac and Gustav Aufricht, founders of the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive surgery in 1922, settled in New York City and both offered cosmetic procedures in addition to necessary reconstruction, in an attempt to legitimize the operations and establish the field. From the late 1920s to 1950s, Maliniac and Aufricht were cited in newspapers discussing the profession and even offering their opinions and expertise on controversial topics like criminal rehabilitation.^{5,6} Newspapers and journalists enjoyed sensationalizing cosmetic operations initially considered an “underground” or taboo activity. Terms like “face-lifting” and

³ "RHINOPLASTY." *The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal (1828-1851)* 22, no. 11 (Apr 22, 1840): 176.

⁴ Paolo Santoni-Rugiu and P. J. Sykes, “Chapter 2: Healing of Wounds and the Development of Surgery,” in *A History of Plastic Surgery*, 1st ed. (Berlin: Springer, 2017), pp. 59-60, 303-305

⁵ Jacques W. Maliniak, “The Plastic Surgeon and Crime,” *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1931-1951)* 26, no. 4 (November 1935): pp. 594-600, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1136323>.

⁶ Emery Deri, “Pretty Up Criminals to Reform 'Em, Says Dr. Aufricht,” *Boston Daily Globe*, May 29, 1927, p. A15.

“beautifying” splashed across major publications from New York to Los Angeles to describe procedures rebuilding noses, lips, crow’s feet, and more.⁷

Even as facial reconstruction became more feasible, scientists grappled with how physical appearance related to character, personality, and anti-social behavior. American newspapers had long been reporting on European criminology theories that identified criminal “traits” that might help solve criminal cases. Beginning in the late 1870s, Cesare Lombroso, Italian surgeon and professor, developed the theories on criminal atavism that would dominate nineteenth and twentieth century societal and medical perspectives on the bodily features that distinguished a “born criminal” from a regular man. Lombroso, considered the father of criminology, repeatedly made the pages of *The New York Times*, *St Louis Dispatch*, and more for consultation on such matters. His published writings were reviewed and discussed in newspapers from Europe to the United States for any common person to read. Lombroso maintained that psychological issues aligned with and came from physical abnormalities. Though he argued crime was rooted in social factors like education and urbanization, his anthropological interest led to his characterization of physical features like noses, ears, foreheads, and feet in the “born criminal.” Providing photographs, sketches, and even handwriting samples of criminals, Lombroso studied roughly 6,600 individual criminals over the course of writing four volumes of *L’Uomo Delinquente (The Criminal Man)*.⁸ The criminal man represented an earlier version in human evolution identifiable by facial asymmetry which also came with moral corruption and degeneration.⁹ Lombroso’s use of biological anthropology, data, and human subjects caused his theories on the “criminaloid” to

⁷ "NEW NOSE AND LIP: REMARKABLE PLASTIC SURGERY ON A WAIF AT THE CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL. *St.Louis Post - Dispatch (1879-1922)*, Sep 21, 1897

⁸ David G. Horn, “Bodies of Evidence,” in *The Criminal Body: Lombroso and the Anatomy of Deviance* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pg. 14.

⁹ Francis T Cullen and Pamela Wilcox, “Encyclopedia of Criminological Theory,” in *Encyclopedia of Criminological Theory* (SAGE Publications, Inc, 2010), pp. 560-565.

catch on in scientific and un-scientific communities alike, eventually influencing future criminologists, psychologists, and prison administrators. Lombroso's theories were accepted as scientifically valid and were used in courtrooms around the world. In America, Lombroso's ideas incited speculation about and attempted to unravel the link between physical traits and criminal behavior through surgical procedures and other medical means.

Early Surgery as Rehabilitation in America's Prisons and the Dillinger Dilemma

Beginning in January of 1910, newspapers around New York started picking up new efforts inside America's prisons to rehabilitate prisoners using plastic surgery. Commissioner Henry Solomon of the Sing Sing Prison, located 30 miles north of New York City, argued that "the convict, at the termination of his sentence, has been released with his physical imperfection continuing to act as a handicap in his struggle for a livelihood. Has the state done everything possible for him unless his physical imperfections have received as careful consideration as his mental and moral ones?"¹⁰ Though he does not explicitly imply a connection between the body and criminal tendencies in Lombroso-fashion, Solomon does suggest criminal rehabilitation should include bodily modification when needed.

Solomon implied that the solution is establishing a proper hospital equipped with instruments and facilities for surgical operations. News outlets began reporting on this unlikely pairing between crime and medicine, particularly plastic surgery, which was usually reserved for victims of war, the wealthy, and the vain. The procedure was not just restricted to New York. A series of articles in 1947 featured the procedures of one Illinois prison. "Can Plastic Surgery Save the Criminal," "Deformities and Ugliness Tied to Crime," "Plastic Surgery Held Helpful to

¹⁰ "Surgery Advocated to Aid Convicts: New York Prison Expert Believes the Knife Would Save Many," *The Atlanta Constitution*, January 10, 1910, pg. 2.

Convicts,” printed news outlets like *The Washington Post*, *The Baltimore Sun*, and *The Los Angeles Times*, respectively, regarding the same story about Chicago inmates. In these articles, plastic surgeons were given a platform to explain the procedure and their theories while convincing the public this was a legitimate therapy.

Almost all accounts emphasized the necessity of being employable, productive, contributive members of society. Fifteen years later, New York Commissioner of Correction Austin MacCormick announced that New York City “might be willing to help [criminals] out with a bit of plastic surgery free of charge,” adding that convicts might be decent men but are unable to get a job because they look like a “broken-down pug.”¹¹ Though MacCormick also stated he had no intention of establishing an official “program” of beautification, he hints at a process to select only some inmates, with consideration of their past record and future intentions. Surgeons involved in later programs echoed these concerns in the future when mentioning convicted sex workers who desired breast augmentation to reach more clients.

Plastic surgeons emerged as strong proponents of the procedures, a stance not entirely surprising given their economic and professional interests. “What employer would give a job to a man with a thug face?” asks Dr. Gustav Aufricht, early pioneer of plastic surgery and self-proclaimed psychologist.¹² In an article for *The Boston Globe*, he spouts ideas drawn from criminologists’ estimates of the crossover between physiognomy and criminality. Aufricht notes, “We all know the type which is generally called ‘the criminal face.’ Its characteristics are the flat, broad nose, ears of abnormal size, thick lips, and frequently noticeable scars and bruises.” Seven years later, New York plastic surgeon Dr. Maxwell Maltz similarly brought together criminology and surgery by identifying cases of “fundamentally honest men” attracted to a life of crime due to

¹¹ “Suggests Face-Lifting To Assist Prisoners Wanting Honest Jobs,” *The Baltimore Sun*, December 20, 1934, p. 1.

¹² Emery Deri, “Pretty Up Criminals to Reform 'Em, Says Dr. Aufricht,” *Boston Daily Globe*, May 29, 1927, p. A15.

misshapen noses, “simian lips,” protruding chins, and “general Neanderthal characteristics.” Maltz advocated changing one’s face to change one’s character to prevent excommunication from society. Both doctors cite concerns over unemployment and contribution to society as the reasons for petty crimes and inevitable jail time.

Though renowned and respected surgeons from around the United States did their best to convince the scientific community, the penal system, and the public of their theories, this did not occur without concern or protest. First and foremost was the concern that once released from prison, ex-convicts receiving plastic surgery would not only continue their history of criminal activity but that they would have a higher likelihood of *not* getting caught again because distinguishable features would no longer assist in their capture. Perhaps the most famous and recognizable case of this is that of John Dillinger, notorious Chicago gangster and Midwest celebrity of sorts. Though his career only lasted from September 1933 to July 1934, he and his accomplices killed ten men, robbed multiple banks and police arsenals, and escaped from jail three times.

Dillinger, in his exploration of the criminal possibilities, famously received plastic surgery to alter his nose, cheeks, chin, *and* fingerprints, becoming a sensation in both the underworld and medical field.¹³ After Dillinger’s attorney, Louis Piquett, introduced him to Drs. Wilhelm Loesser and Harold Bernard Cassidy, Dillinger spent \$5,000 on his operation and post-op care. After supposedly receiving too much ether and temporarily choking on his tongue, Dillinger decided on less effective local anesthetic for the hours-long procedure. Together, Loesser and Cassidy removed a forehead mole and Dillinger’s infamous cleft chin, implanted kangaroo tendons to smooth his cheek dimples, and attempted to remove his fingerprints with acid, although this would

¹³ "John Dillinger." In *St. James Encyclopedia of Popular Culture Online*. Detroit, MI: Gale, 2013. *Gale In Context: Biography*

later prove to be ineffective.¹⁴ They were arraigned on federal warrants and charged with harboring and concealing a criminal from governmental pursuit. Both pled guilty and were held on bonds of \$25,000 each.¹⁵ Decades later it would be revealed John Dillinger first asked female surgeon Dr. Else K. LaRoe at gunpoint for his operation, though she refused.¹⁶ Two years later, drama film *The Man Who Lived Twice* would be released by Columbia Pictures depicting a criminal receiving plastic surgery to change his identity. During the operation, however, he loses his memory and wakes up with the goal of becoming a doctor to help people.¹⁷ In the movie, just as surgeons promised, the refaced convict became a reformed man.

Just two years later, Chicago police were asked to visit offices of all plastic surgeons in the city in search of Carmelia Freed, who was suspected of murdering cabaret star Audrye Vallette. After a fruitless seven-day search, investigators believed Freed had “undergone plastic surgery in the manner of the late John Dillinger” since no one had yet to successfully recognize or capture her.¹⁸

A few years before Dillinger, *The Hartford Courant* identified three men in 1928 who had undergone plastic surgery operations on the East and West Coasts. Stephen Hoppe, posing as “George Bersig” had escaped Maine State Prison and paid New York surgeon Dr. J Eastman Sheehan \$500 for his operation. Willing Jackson, based in Chicago, also traveled to New York City for rhinoplasty. Jackson’s nose had been smashed after previous altercations, but he had it

¹⁴ “Dillinger's Plastic Surgery on Pulaski Rd. (or Crawford Ave.?),” Dillinger's Plastic Surgery on Pulaski Rd. (or Crawford Ave.?), October 4, 2009, <http://chicagocrimescenes.blogspot.com/2009/10/dillingers-plastic-surgery-on-pulaski.html>.

¹⁵ “2 Dillinger Doctors Confess: Jail Attorney and 6 Others in Federal Drive,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, September 2, 1934, pp. 1-1.

¹⁶ Ben Ray Redman, “She Refused to Remold John Dillinger's Face,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, March 24, 1957, p. B4.

¹⁷ “The Man Who Lived Twice,” IMDb (IMDb.com, Inc), accessed February 20, 2022, <https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0027939/>.

¹⁸ “Hunt Mrs. Freed as a Patient of Facial Surgeons: Think She May Be Using Dillinger Trick,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, July 10, 1936, pp. 5-5.

straightened, grew a mustache, and curled his hair. “Even as he lay dead, the police did not know him,” reported *The Hartford Courant*. Criminals did not just use surgery to escape authorities, one convict thought it might help him escape his character. While serving a five-year term in Folsom State Prison, Jim Daley believed that if “only he could look ‘straight’ he’d be straight.” Daley reportedly had a broken nose, deep-lined cheeks, and a down-cornered mouth that made him repulsive to decent people and drove him to crime. Prison authorities, in connection with social workers, granted his request.¹⁹

Dr. Jacques Maliniac held his position at the American Society of Plastic Surgeons for roughly four years before he came to study the relationship between criminology, surgery, and identity, resulting in a public address at the 1935 annual meeting of the Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery.²⁰ In this address, later published in *The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology*, Maliniac voices his concern on the unknown number of “fugitives from justice [who] owe their freedom to surgical changes in their appearance.” He outlines several ways to identify signs, changes, and discreet scarring as results of previous operations as if training his fellow colleagues to have a detective’s eye when seeing new patients. “Fortunately, each change is accompanied by some scarring, no matter how cleverly concealed,” writes Maliniac. Looking out for both doctor and detective, he suggests that “closer cooperation between plastic surgeons and the authorities would go far to prevent the witting or unwitting prostitution of an honorable specialty to the purposes of crime.” He ends his address by saying that “every precaution should be taken to prevent the diversion of a reputable branch of medicine to the service of the lawless.”²¹

¹⁹ “Underworld Takes Up Plastic Surgery: Progressive-Minded Crooks Try to Baffle Police Identification By Changing Faces but Indelible Spots Give Them Away,” *The Hartford Courant*, July 8, 1928, pp. E1-5.

²⁰ The Plastic Surgery Foundation, “About the Maliniac Circle,” The Plastic Surgery Foundation (The Plastic Surgery Foundation), accessed February 17, 2022, <https://www.the-psf.org/support-the-psf/the-maliniac-circle/about-the-maliniac-circle>.

²¹ Jacques W. Maliniac, “The Plastic Surgeon and Crime,” *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* (1931-1951) 26, no. 4 (November 1935): pp. 594-600, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1136323>.

Other concerns besides increased criminal activity, evasion of police, and experimentation were voiced by skeptics who simply did not believe that *anything*, even plastic surgery, could change one's morals or behavior. Criminologist Dr. Carleton Simon, former Special Deputy Commissioner of the New York Police Department, believed in "facial asymmetries" that one is born with, and irreversible changes to the face acquired in prison that even the best plastic surgeon couldn't fix. In 1933, Simon told *Washington Post* reporter Charles Duke, "This experience of long servitude is indelibly impressed upon [a man's] social viewpoints. His general appearance and his facial delineations have undergone changes that can never be erased." Simon also alluded to a more rapid aging process occurring in prison "due to dread, anxiety, and fear," resulting in permanently wrinkled and creased faces and possibly effecting the "protoplasm, through the medium of the thyroid, the adrenals and sympathetic nervous system." Like Lombroso, he suggests that "irregular-shaped faces," disproportionate heads, uneven eyes, and other features "are too often found in analysis of the underworld." Interviewed just one month before John Dillinger began his crime spree, Dr. Simon did not reference any specific criminal or instance but was concerned that plastic surgery for convicts could have dangerous implications for the public, chiefly the inability of witnesses to correctly identify a suspect at a crime scene.²²

From Armed Forces to Local Law

During the late 1940s, a study known as *Operation Stateville*, conducted through a partnership between the Illinois State Penitentiary and the University of Illinois Medical School in Chicago gained attention from several news sources. "Deformities and Ugliness Tied to Crime," published *The Baltimore Sun* while *The Chicago Tribune* declared "Surgery Aids Convicts"

²² Charles W Duke, "Can Plastic Surgery Save the Criminal?," *The Washington Post*, August 6, 1933, p. M6.

Morale.”^{23,24} These articles discussed a ten-year study beginning in 1937 with just six inmates conducted by Dr. John F. Pick, former chief plastic surgeon in the U.S. Army and clinical professor of surgery at the University of Illinois Medical School. After returning from his post in the Army, Pick believed that plastic surgery held psychological as well as physical value. Pick theorized that these deformities – crooked noses, skin tumors, pinned ears, webbed hands and feet – created triggers in prisoners that could lead to a “gastric ulcer in one individual or lead another to crime.” These original six inmates were said to now lead lives of “ordinary, law-obeying citizens.” Dr. Frank Chmelik, chief surgeon at Stateville, and warden Joseph Ragen invited Dr. Pick to operate on any one of the 4,500 prisoners who needed or volunteered for plastic surgery. Pick accepted and charged the state nothing but a mere lunch for him and his nurse every Wednesday when they operated. Chmelik estimated that 20-25% of inmates suffered from at least one deformity of the jaw, nose, mouth, palate, legs, feet, hands, or skin. “[Dr. Pick] felt there was a tie between their freak-like looks and the fact they were in jail,” reported journalists David Anderson and Robert Cromie in “New Faces-New Lives” for *The Baltimore Sun*.²⁵

Warden Ragen only had one condition for Dr. Pick: photographs must be taken before and after each operation for the prison’s identification file. These operations would be based on how soon each inmate was up for parole or discharge, the only exceptions being for those with life sentences or long-term sentences whose morale might improve with immediate surgery on their conditions.

“Dr. Pick expressed the belief today their ugliness or deformities may have served as the spark that started them off in crime,” said *The Washington Post*.²⁶ “Where bodily defects of gross

²³ “Deformities and Ugliness Tied to Crime,” *The Baltimore Sun*, October 1, 1947, p. 3.

²⁴ “Surgery Aids Convicts' Morale: 728 Get Help,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 2, 1947, p. 10.

²⁵ David Anderson and Robert Cromie, “New Faces-New Lives,” *The Baltimore Sun*, May 22, 1949, p. MS4.

²⁶ “Surgeon Links Deformities to Crime,” *The Washington Post*, October 1, 1947, p. 4.

features exist in the youthful delinquent, who all his life has been referred to as monkey-face, fish-face, dog-ears, limpy, that such defects should be corrected and their trigger value removed before the boy delinquent becomes a man criminal.” By 1947, his study had grown to 376 inmates with more than 200 reportedly on the waiting list. Pick stated in a speech to the International College of Surgeons that “the psychological results have been the most outstanding feature and gain.”²⁷

“These men were victims of the stigma of a physical deformity,” said Pick in *The Baltimore Sun*. “What’s the use? I look like a thug and I couldn’t get a decent job if I wanted one,” the inmates would tell Ragen. Eight-hundred corrective operations later with no deaths or post-operative complications, Pick received nothing but praise and admiration from the inmates of Stateville. “Even though it was five more years in jail, it was worth waiting. I know what woulda happened – the same thing all over again. I’d a been back. Now I’ll never be back. I got a trade, I got more sense – and I got a schnozz that looks like everybody else’s. Doc’s a wonderful guy,” said an inmate described as having a “circus clown’s nose.” Less than 1% of prisoner-patients had returned to prison following their release.²⁸ While that number had grown to 5% by 1949, the rate of recidivism was still lower than among the general prison population, where it was 17%. Ragen claimed that these results were “proof of a connection between deformity and crime in a certain percentage of the prison population” and hoped that the state would eventually fund the project someday and that it might even spread to other prisons in America and become “just as routine as dentistry.”²⁹

Texas Prisons Take Up Plastic Surgery

²⁷ “Plastic Surgery Held Helpful To Convicts,” *The Los Angeles Times*, October 1, 1947, p. 1.

²⁸ “Surgery Aids Convicts' Morale: 728 Get Help,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, October 2, 1947, p. 10.

²⁹ David Anderson and Robert Cromie, “New Faces-New Lives,” *The Baltimore Sun*, May 22, 1949, p. MS4.

By the mid-1950s, these partnerships between hospitals and prisons had gone south to the Lone Star State. Oscar B. Ellis, director of the Texas State Prison System, piloted a collaboration between the University of Texas Medical Branch, the Texas Department of Correction, and Baylor University College of Medicine beginning in 1954. The article “Disfigured Cons Aided with Plastic Surgery,” reports a nearly identical set of facts and stories as those in New York and Chicago. By 1958, an estimated 450 convicts had benefited from the work of plastic surgeons and left the penal system with “a new outlook on life.”³⁰ Through good behavior and cooperation, convicts could earn their spot under the knife – a spot that would usually cost a civilian upwards of \$5,000, according to Richard Jones, a representative of the prison system. At this point in time, plastic surgeons performed their services in prisons for free. Ellis believed strongly in the success of this program, claiming it was an “integral part of rehabilitation” especially for those wanting to find work. “It is a proven factor of criminology that facial deformities and other disfigurements contribute to personality complexes and handicap a man,” he said. A newspaper article from the *Austin Statesman* supports this claim with a case study of a man dubbed “Frankenstein” cursed with protruding ears and chin, misaligned teeth, and a flat and twisted nose that affected his educational prospects, work life, and marriage.³¹ Eleven operations later, the man once known as Frankenstein left prison with a “brand new personality.”³²

Just a few years later, four doctors from the Baylor University College of Medicine and the Cora and Webb Mading Department of Surgery published their own findings from the previous eleven years in the *British Journal of Plastic Surgery* to encourage the establishment of future plastic surgery programs. What previous articles had failed to mention was the role of medical

³⁰ “New Faces Help Convicts Go Straight,” *The Hartford Courant*, January 13, 1958, p. 6B.

³¹ “Plastic Surgery Given Some Texas Convicts,” *The Austin Statesman*, September 20, 1962, p. B6.

³² “Disfigured Cons Aided with Plastic Surgery,” *The Austin Statesman*, January 13, 1958, p. 3.

residents in these partnerships. Plastic surgery residents devoted almost 45 hours per month in the form of 15 procedures. They received no compensation for their services save the opportunity to develop surgical skills and practice operations that would not have been allowed at a local city or county hospital. Drs. Melvin Spira, John Chizen, Frank Gerow, and Baron Hardy affirmed that a prison hospital is just as much a part of the rehabilitation of a convict as social services, psychological services, and skills learning. In fact, the prison hospital was staffed by *current* inmates as clerks, lab technicians, and even nurses, based on their previous professional experiences or special aptitude. At that point, 22 states possessed reconstructive and plastic surgery programs in their penal systems; of the 28 that did *not*, 12 expressed interest in establishing programs.³³

The authors maintained that surgery was to be earned through good behavior and cooperative attitude. From 1954 to 1964 rhinoplasty stayed at the top of most desired procedures with 357 cases, followed by scar revisions. Director Ellis again makes an appearance stating, “correction of these defects definitely enhances the chance of an inmate's making a satisfactory adjustment to society after release,” which is only supported by the 17% recidivism rate of the prisoners receiving plastic surgery compared to a rate of 32% among those who did not.

Because of an increasing jail population and decreasing prison staff and high turnover, Texas prisons pushed for more and more operations in the hopes to stretch their wallet. By 1972, Texas hospital records show 2,850 cosmetic procedures had been performed.³⁴ However, around the same time these results were published, notorious prison Riker’s Island in New York City was

³³ Melvin Spira et al., “Plastic Surgery in the Texas Prison System,” *British Journal of Plastic Surgery* 19 (September 1966): pp. 364-371, [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0007-1226\(66\)80080-2](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0007-1226(66)80080-2).

³⁴ Stone, p. 259.

gearing up to commence what would become one of the most documented, respected, and well-known program of this kind to date.

The Big Apple Gives Plastic Surgery a Second Chance

The Social and Surgical Rehabilitation Project of Adult Offenders (SSR) was the brainchild of surgeon Dr. Michael Lewin, sociologist Dr. Douglas Lipton, and New York Corrections Commissioner Anna Kross. After receiving \$250,000 from the Vocational Rehabilitation Administration, a branch of the now dissolved U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, work commenced July 1, 1964 on what would become the first federally funded scientific project to determine if plastic surgery truly affected recidivism in prison inmates.³⁵

Word of the SSR was first picked up by *The Hartford Courant*, a year after the program began. In October 1964, the article “Plastic Surgery for Prisoners” described the federally funded pilot program through the partnership of Montefiore Hospital, Riker’s Island, and the Staten Island Mental Health Society. The program, spearheaded by Drs. Douglas Lipton, Michael Lewin, and Richard Kurtzberg, removed tattoos, scars, and other disfigurements to improve both “outlook on life” and employment prospects. The article even references “the worst series of murders” in Connecticut, which had been committed by a man known as “The Chin” known for its disproportionately large size, to help legitimize and support the program’s reasoning. Additionally, the article ends with a brief history of criminality, mentioning the early work of Lombroso and his attempts to characterize criminals simply by their earlobes and how the program recognizes the criminal as an individual.³⁶

³⁵ Sydney H. Schanberg, “Scar Removal Found to Reduce Repeaters Among Ex-Convicts,” *The New York Times*, August 22, 1966, pp. 1-23.

³⁶ “Plastic Surgery for Prisoners,” *The Hartford Courant*, October 26, 1964, p. 14.

Gradually, Lipton, Lewin, and Kurtzberg began appearing in popular newspapers, and medical journals, and spoke at the American Society for Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons. In an article published in *The New York Times*, Lipton described the inception of the SSR and its inner workings. The researchers received over 1,500 applications from inmates for plastic surgery, 650 of whom were deemed to be suffering from “reparable defects.” 450 inmates proceeded with surgery.³⁷ Roughly 200 individuals withdrew their applications after fully understanding both the limitations of plastic surgery and the timeframe needed to expect desired results. Dr. Lewin, in a journal article for the Association for periOperative Registered Nurses (AORN), shed light on the state of plastic surgery at the time and the patient’s, as well as general public’s, skewed perspective. For example, patients were sometimes unaware that removing tattoos would leave a scar, that skin graft effectiveness depended on skin texture and color, and rhinoplasty and other nasal operations had limitations too.³⁸ However, many patients were more than satisfied with post-operative scars as opposed to carrying the stigma of their previous lives.

Originally, the leaders of the project planned to perform only reconstructive procedures for improved function, but as they progressed, the majority of applications were for correction of non-functional but stigmatizing features like facial scarring, tattoos, needle tracks, and nasal deformities. For example, heroin addicts, in an effort to eradicate their previous identity as a drug user, found it essential to be “cured” of their past by removing their physical scars. Tattooed inmates also felt similarly, especially those with gang affiliations or swastikas. In the same AORN article, Lewin provides two case studies of former inmates. A thirty-five-year-old former heroin addict of ten years was drug free for several years and felt comfortable accepting better jobs after

³⁷ Richard L. Kurtzberg et al., “Psychologic Screening of Inmates Requesting Cosmetic Operations,” *Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery* 39, no. 4 (1967): pp. 387-396, <https://doi.org/10.1097/00006534-196704000-00009>.

³⁸ Michael L. Lewin, “Plastic Surgery in Rehabilitation of the Prison Inmate,” *AORN Journal* 7, no. 4 (1968): pp. 64-69, [https://doi.org/10.1016/s0001-2092\(08\)70265-5](https://doi.org/10.1016/s0001-2092(08)70265-5).

his visible needle tracks had been removed. The second, a housewife and mother of a thirteen-year-old daughter, lived in fear that her family would see her jailhouse tattoos. Only after they were removed was she able to be comfortable and have an enjoyable relationship with her family. Contrary to Lombroso, Lipton and the other researchers did not believe in such a thing as a born criminal but rather a combination of physical, environmental, and psychological factors contributed to the development of a criminal. Lewin goes on record to say criminals are a source of undeveloped potential and “must be assisted to become a productive member of society.”^{39,40}

These prisoner-patients revealed through psychiatric evaluation and interviews that their motivation in receiving surgery was primarily to free themselves from self-conscious preoccupation about their deformities. Lipton, Lewin, and Kurtzberg prided themselves on their level of thoroughness and data collection, especially for psychological screening. The average inmate requesting surgery had been previously incarcerated six or more times and had a ninth-grade education. Sixty-seven percent were heroin addicts. The researchers used a combination of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), Tennessee Self-Concept Scale (TSCS), Sacks Sentence Completion Test, and Draw-A-Person Test. They claimed that their data “clearly showed that a prison population ranks much lower in self-esteem, both overall and physically,” saying inmates are more self-conscious about their physical appearance than the average person.⁴¹

Four-hundred-forty-three men were assigned to one of four treatment groups. The project was intended to include women, but few applied and only seven women were operated on.⁴² One group received only surgery, the second received a combination of surgery and social-vocational services, the third received only social-vocational services, and the final group received neither.

³⁹ Lewin, “Plastic Surgery in Rehabilitation of the Prison Inmate.”

⁴⁰ “Scar Removal Helps Reform Convicts,” *The Hartford Courant*, August 29, 1966, p. 18.

⁴¹ Kurtzberg et al.

⁴² Schanberg.

Additionally, groups were arranged so that each had roughly the same percentage of drug addicts and a similar racial makeup. The researchers found correlations between the type of deformity and specific criminal behaviors, like thievery with nose deformities, tattoos with burglary, and facial scars with assault.⁴³ For non-addicts, the overall recidivism rate was 32% compared to 68% for those that did not receive surgery. 89% of non-addicts that received vocational services alone recidivated compared to 30% that received surgery alone, 33% that received surgery and services, and 56% for those that received neither.⁴⁴ “We don’t do as well with addicts because they have a compulsion we can’t do anything for,” said Lipton for *The New York Times*. After two years, a final year was allotted to follow up with the recently released prisoner-patients at six months and again at twelve. In a later paper, Kurtzberg emphasized the importance of postsurgical follow-up, suggesting monetary incentives for these six and twelve-month appointments.⁴⁵ Lipton also mentions federal interest in extending the program by an additional two years, though nothing came of this.

Looking towards the future, Dr. Lewin claimed the concept of modern rehabilitation needed close interdisciplinary cooperation. He believed the field of plastic surgery was most closely aligned with the values of rehabilitation and wanted to see a plastic surgeon working alongside the likes of a sociologist and psychiatrist when assessing one’s options for rehabilitation and especially *re-integration*. The suggestion of including a surgeon in the field of criminology was not new, however. In the early 1930s, Illinois state probation officer Mrs. George Palmer, concerned with overcrowding in the state’s prisons, suggested employing a staff of physicians to

⁴³ “Plastic Surgery May Aid Convicts: Hopeful Pilot Scheme,” *The Irish Times*, August 29, 1966, p. 6.

⁴⁴ Park Elliott Dietz, “Medical Criminology Notes #.2 Cosmetic Surgical Treatment of Offenders,” *Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law* 5, no. 4 (1977): pp. 465-469.

⁴⁵ Richard Kurtzberg, Howard Safar, and Wallace Mandell, “Plastic Surgery in Corrections,” *Federal Probation* 33, no. 3 (September 1969): pp. 44-47.

advise judges when hearing cases, much like Lewin's idea. However, in the same article, Dr. George Brown, professor of plastic surgery at the University of Wisconsin, made a specific distinction between cosmetic surgery practiced by "quacks" and real plastic surgery to correct deformities: the blurred line that prison plastic surgeons would have to grapple with in the future.⁴⁶ Lewin wished for plastic surgery to be made available to underprivileged adolescents to prevent a criminal mindset before it developed. His wish came true the same year when a study published in the *Cincinnati Journal of Medicine* found that psychological testing of juveniles, following plastic surgery operations divided into cosmetic procedures, congenital defects, traumatic injuries, and tumor removal documented "behavioral improvement of the individual" though they also stated surgery by itself was not a cure.⁴⁷ Similar studies with adolescents had already been done roughly a decade earlier in Britain.⁴⁸ Lewin also argued that pairing prisons with a teaching program like that at a medical university improved care standards and gave medical residents an opportunity to practice their skills while keeping costs to a minimum, foreshadowing what would become the foundation of plastic surgery programs in Texas prisons.⁴⁹

Behind Bars to Beauty Queen in Beverly Hills

The 1970s saw a shift in attitude regarding these charitable operations, particularly in Los Angeles at the Sybil Brand Institute for Women. Advocates of plastic surgery for men primarily cited employment and productivity reasons to get convicts help. "Reconstructing Self-Esteem," "Plastic Surgery for Women in Prison: It Can Mean a New Life," read the headlines about Dr. Harry Glassman, Beverly Hills plastic surgeon to the stars, and his generosity. Glassman was

⁴⁶ "Medical Advice Urged to Curb Jail Crowding," *Chicago Daily Tribune*, May 21, 1930, p. 33.

⁴⁷ L H Munick, R S Jones, and J J Longacre, "Juvenile Delinquency, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court and Plastic Surgery—a Joint Venture," *Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery* 41, no. 1 (1968): p. 101, <https://doi.org/10.1097/00006534-196801000-00058>.

⁴⁸ "Delinquent and His Nose: Both Straightened Out," *The Manchester Guardian*, February 13, 1959, p. 11.

⁴⁹ Lewin, "Plastic Surgery in Rehabilitation of the Prison Inmate."

inspired by an article he read in *The Los Angeles Times* in which recidivism was said to have reached 70% in jails and motivated by Governor Edmund Brown Jr's offer to fund malpractice insurance in exchange for doctor's charitable time.⁵⁰ The first record of Glassman's partnership with Sybil Brand was published in early 1977 in *The Los Angeles Times*. The article describes 18-year-old Angela, nicknamed Beak for her "long and bumpy" nose, who received a \$1,250 nose job free of charge from Dr. Glassman. "What's the matter with you, doing this for free?" asked a cautious 21-year-old Virginia Davis, doing two months for violating her probation. "Like everybody else, prisoners want to be beautiful. Perhaps it will heal psychic as well as physical scars," he said. Glassman chose a women's correctional facility because he argued that society placed more of a premium on their appearances. He hoped plastic surgery could bolster their self-esteem and confidence.⁵¹

Concerned about liability and a possible malpractice lawsuit, Sybil Brand allowed Glassman only to interview and screen patients while in prison, though inmates had to wait until their release to actually receive surgery, evoking the policy of the SSR. Glassman seemed to be much stricter with his selection methods; he accepted six or seven out of a hundred, gradually resulting in roughly forty operations over the course of Glassman's time with Sybil Brand. Glassman, after all, was only one man. Candidates were rejected for operations requiring a team of surgeons or wishing to make more money through prostitution. Of those forty Glassman operated on, he reconstructed breasts after cancer surgeries, rebuilt many noses, removed gang-affiliated tattoos, and had many requests to move needle scars though he said that not much could be done. At the time, Glassman believed it was too early to evaluate the success of his efforts, but

⁵⁰ Jad Sleiman, "Unwrapping the Strange History of Prison Plastic Surgery," WHYY (WHYY, September 17, 2021), <https://whyy.org/segments/unwrapping-the-strange-history-of-prison-plastic-surgery>

⁵¹ "Plastic Surgeon Donates Time to Prisoners," *The Hartford Courant*, June 19, 1977, p. 9E.

he thought the project could hold significant legitimacy.⁵² Unfortunately, after three years of collecting data and tracking patients, LA County Sheriff Peter Pitchess reported the recidivism rate was 70%, the same percentage that inspired Dr. Glassman in the first place.⁵³ However, that statistic alone wasn't enough for other institutions and surgeons to stop trying.

The Pinnacle and Plummet of Plastic Surgery Programs in the U.S.

The turning point for plastic surgery in the Texas Prison system came during the late 1980s just a few years after four more doctors from Galveston and Huntsville published their findings in the *Southern Medical Journal*. "Cosmetic Surgery and Criminal Rehabilitation" reported 253 inmates were granted cosmetic procedures between 1982 and 1984. Researchers concluded that a positive relationship existed between cosmetic surgery and criminal rehabilitation by measuring recidivism rates. Documented at one, two, and three years after release, convicts had recidivism rates of 8, 17, and 25% respectively as compared to the usual 14, 32, and 36% rates. In this study, there was no control group, no separate groups for psychotherapy and skill training, and psychological testing was also not conducted prior to the study as compared to the SSR. Though the researchers did not believe that physical defects would necessarily lead to criminality, they trusted that cosmetic change brings physical and spiritual relief from their deformities.⁵⁴

A 1986 *Dallas Morning News* article described convicted murderer Loyal James as looking "ageless" thanks to his operation. Another inmate, James Kelly, convicted of burglarizing a home two years prior, was born with a deformity preventing him from closing his mouth and had his lower jaw "handsomely rebuilt" with bones from his hip. The article goes on to describe the good

⁵² Betty Liddick, "Plastic Surgery for Inmates: Reconstruction of Self-Esteem," *The Los Angeles Times*, January 25, 1977, p. F1.

⁵³ Sleiman

⁵⁴ Alan M. Freedman et al., "Cosmetic Surgery and Criminal Rehabilitation," *Southern Medical Journal* 81, no. 9 (September 1988): pp. 1113-1116, <https://doi.org/10.1097/00007611-198809000-00012>.

behavior incentives and point system for attitude, work ethic, and even participation in Alcoholics Anonymous. Their plastic surgery “costs the state little” and program director Dr. Armond Start explained that the only other expense is the cost of using the prison operating room. “I believe it can be a significant part of their rehabilitation,” he said. Start could have been right, too; James Kelly, for example, went on to tell the *Morning News*, “If I hadn’t had this problem, I don’t think I would have gotten in trouble. Now, I don’t think I’ll ever come back.”⁵⁵

“Two-time loser Tommy Thompson has a prettier face, thanks to the taxpayers of Texas,” begins investigative journalist Steven Long. Written for *The Houston Chronicle*, “Free Cosmetic Surgery Done on Prisoners” discusses Texas inmates and their free procedures, the doctors performing these operations, Texas Department of Corrections (TDC) officials, and even the district attorney and state senator. After multiple FOIA requests and denials with the TDC and University of Texas Medical Branch (UTMB), Long was slowly granted documents revealing the inner workings of the plastic surgery programs inside Texas prisons.⁵⁶ Interviewing both supporters and critics, Long provides a thorough look at the previous thirty years in Texas plastic surgery programs. He points to a 1980 federal court order requiring that inmates of the TDC receive the same care available to patients of the John Sealy Hospital in Galveston, Texas, including cosmetic surgery.

Tommy Thompson, who was serving 60 years for theft and compelling prostitution, received a face lift, liposuction, and a brow lift, performed by ear-nose-throat surgeon Dr. Karen Calhoun, that granted him a 21-day, \$12,117 post-op stay in the hospital. On one side, supporters of the cosmetic surgery said that prisoner-patients help surgeons perfect their craft while being

⁵⁵ “Changing the Face of Convicts' Futures Plastic Surgery Provides Training for Doctors, Hope for Prisoners,” *Dallas Morning News*, January 19, 1986, p. A12.

⁵⁶ Zara Stone, “PRETTY TOUGH IN TEXAS: Investment in Prison Plastic Surgery,” in *Killer Looks: The Forgotten History of Plastic Surgery in Prisons* (Prometheus, 2021), p. 264.

able to rehabilitate inmates. Senator Aaron Schwartz, creator of the legislation establishing the TDC hospital, defended the cosmetic surgery in Long's article saying, "It's a teaching situation. The prisoners darn sure know that it is a teaching situation when they go in there." Residents had to fulfill quotas for operations in their specialties to obtain medical licenses and prisoner-patients were one way to meet that quota. Not everyone requesting surgery could get it either. Inmates, like Thompson, had to be recommended by prison psychiatrists for candidacy. Medical professionals like Dr. Byron Baily, ENT surgery supervisor, defended the program and assured Long that cosmetic surgery is performed on inmates nationwide. Others also maintained that these operations on inmates could be viewed more as functional procedures with cosmetic benefits, for example, reconstructing an obstructed nasal passageway for better breathing that simultaneously improved appearance. Dr. Martin Robson, head of plastic surgery at UTMB no longer perform purely cosmetic surgery and considered procedures like breast reductions and implants "reconstructive" rather than cosmetic. Dr. Calhoun explained her reasoning for the necessity of rhinoplasty in prison populations saying, "It's rare for a TDC inmate to come in who hasn't had a broken nose." She also claimed that cosmetic surgery doesn't result in the dramatic changes in appearance that many were concerned about. "What a face lift does is make a person look like they had a real good night's sleep," she said.

Additionally, prison officials reported that this partnership had existed for decades, regardless of the court order. Long also cites the study from the *Southern Medical Journal* and others that indicate an improved appearance may reduce recidivism. "If there is a value in the rehabilitation of a patient to reduce recidivism, [cosmetic surgery] can be justified," said Dr. Alvin LeBlanc, UTMB vice president of hospital affairs, though he did admit tax-funded cosmetic surgery on convicts also raised "philosophical questions."

Others were completely unaware of these operations and quite critical when Long informed them. Galveston District Attorney Michael Guarino said, "I can think of better candidates for such a thing. Lord knows there are plenty of indigents who could use it before inmates do." Between 1987 and 1988, the TDC hospital in Galveston had 2,869 admissions totaling \$16,432,744 at \$577 average cost per day for one patient. "The TDC hospital is the best prison hospital in the world," said UTMB heart surgeon Dr. John Derrick, "The inmates are two to a room, with television and room service and they don't have to pay for it." Though the TDC is not billed for the surgery on their inmates, UTMB is supported by taxes since it is a state school. "I don't understand the philosophy of funding this," said Harris County District Attorney John Holmes Jr, "The state's not paying for this, I am." The fees for non-inmate patients were \$825 for a face-lift; \$660 for an eyelid operation; \$650 for a forehead lift; \$600 for liposuction; and \$600 for rhinoplasty. Prison officials at other facilities also disagreed that these procedures were commonplace. Spokesmen for the Illinois and New York Departments of Correctional Services received little to no cosmetic or elective surgeries.

Mr. Thompson, hoping for parole the same year, said "I feel 100 percent better. I have high praise for the staff. They treated me real well. I've done everything I could in here to help rehabilitate myself. This is the best thing yet that I've done in here to make me feel better about myself. It's difficult when you have problems and you are re-entering society. I don't want to come back to this place, not at all."⁵⁷

By 1989, five to six-thousand cosmetic operations took place in prisons each year. Besides the public coverage from newspapers around the United States and the articles published around the world, people had started taking note of the free "facelifts" convicts received and the social

⁵⁷ Steven Long, "Free Cosmetic Surgery Done on Prisoners," *Houston Chronicle*, April 2, 1989, p. 1.

implications that came with them. In July of 1989, *The Chicago Tribune*, *The Hartford Courant*, *The Austin Statesman*, and *The Edmonton Journal* of Alberta, Canada all published the same article from Ann Landers, advice columnist and media personality. “A wrinkle in Texas prison rules allows inmates ‘free’ face-lifts,” “It’s true: Texas prison gives free face-lifts,” and “Free face-lifts for inmates a fact of life in Texas jails,” all told the story from an anonymous tip that men and women in the Texas State Prison can have a free face-lift billed to Texas taxpayers. They end with a source to verify these claims. Landers’ source ends up being none other than Steven Long. Long revealed hundreds of inmates had been getting face-lifts, liposuction, and rhinoplasty. She does mention studies proving that inmates were less likely to return to prison if they had a higher level of self-esteem but quickly provides the “big negative” that taxpayers are the ones paying for the cosmetic procedures. “I’m sure plenty of people would be very pleased if they could get work done with no charge,” concludes Landers.⁵⁸

In fact, plenty of Landers’ readers *would* like to have had free plastic surgery and they soon wrote in to express their opinions. A letter addressed to Texas Governor Bill Clements from a disgruntled citizen named “H.B. Kifsby” describes their disapproval, “This is the straw that broke the camel’s back. We would all like to have cosmetic surgery, but we can’t afford it...but we have to pay for a convict? This is almost unbelievable.” Beverly Gowing from Friona, Texas said “We cannot afford medication for our elderly and can afford a face-lift for killers and rapists? We are taxed for everything and double-taxed for some of that. I do not feel that inmate plastic surgery is helping Texas in any way.”⁵⁹ Though both the hospital and TDC contested Long’s article and the claims made, Governor Clements openly denounced the practice and ordered the chairman of the

⁵⁸ Ann Landers, “A Wrinkle in Texas Prison Rules Allows Inmates ‘Free’ Face-Lifts,” *The Hartford Courant*, July 13, 1989, p. F6.

⁵⁹ Governor William P. Clements Jr. Official State Papers, First Term, 1979-1983

TDC to investigate. Dr. Start attempted to explain the procedures with a simple cost-benefit analysis telling the press “While we spend many, many dollars in education teaching [inmates] a trade or vocation, sometimes we can do it much less expensively just by changing their appearance.” Additionally, the UTMB protested, saying the surgeries were functional rather than cosmetic, which Texas surgeons themselves contradicted. ENT supervisor Dr. Baily acknowledged that “pinning” back ears generally does not improve hearing is essentially cosmetic. Even Tommy Thompson’s surgeon, Dr. Calhoun, admitted his operation had no functional purpose.⁶⁰

Charles Terrell, chairman of the TDC, asked the UTMB to take “whatever steps necessary to ensure the immediate termination of cosmetic surgery to TDC inmates.”⁶¹ Prior to Long’s article, the 1987 TDC Appropriations Bill added a clause that banned using state funds for cosmetic surgery unless “significantly disfigured and disturbed” in response to claims that inmates were receiving breast implants. Still, the TDC maintained they were aware of this clause and had not violated it in *The Houston Chronicle*. “Disfigured and disturbed” was a phrase still determined and judged by the prison psychiatrist; nevertheless, the TDC established a policy demanding all cosmetic operations be personally approved by the prison’s medical director. Later that June, after government backlash and public disapproval, the UTMB cancelled all elective cosmetic treatments and expressed wishes to “stay out of trouble with everybody” after claiming to have no knowledge these operations were prohibited.⁶²

Three days after Long’s article was published, the Louisiana Governor quickly approved legislation to prevent cosmetic surgery in the state after discovering an inmate, serving a twenty-

⁶⁰ Long

⁶¹ Governor William P, Clements Jr. Official State Papers, Second Term, 1987-1991, Texas State Library and Archives Commission

⁶² Steven Long, “UTMB to Halt Cosmetic Surgery for TDC Inmates,” *Houston Chronicle*, June 6, 1989

five-year sentence for rape, received a \$5,000 testicle implant.⁶³ The Alaska Department of Corrections also updated their own policies shortly after explicitly stating “elective cosmetic surgery is not to be covered by the budget.”

Rehabilitation, Research, and the Future

Due to a combination of public outrage, ethical concerns, and changing attitudes on prison rehabilitation, all cosmetic surgery programs in prisons ended by the mid-1990s. Cosmetic surgery, recently being dubbed “aesthetic surgery,” for criminals to evade identification and the law is not going away anytime soon as exhibited most recently in Netflix’s *The Tinder Swindler*. “He wanted to change his cheekbones, his nose, his lips, maybe his chin,” said Ayleen, the previous girlfriend of Simon Leviev, the conman dubbed the “Tinder Swindler.”⁶⁴ Plastic surgery seems to be an easy solution to many aesthetic dilemmas, not just criminal, as it experiences an all-time high, becoming more and more socially acceptable, open, and encouraged.

The United States continues to rank number one in terms of the highest incarcerated population in the world, reaching as high as 2.3 million people in 2008. However, cosmetic surgery as a method of rehabilitation in convicts is not likely to see a resurgence. Currently, inmates experience a criminal justice system focused on punitive, rather than rehabilitative methods, though the U.S. Justice Department lists several recent and ongoing reforms to reduce recidivism on their website, updated as of March 6, 2017. Launching a tablet-based pilot program for education, encouraging the development of marketable job skills, prioritizing mental health treatment, phasing out private prison use, and more.⁶⁵ On this list, the words “medical,” “surgery,”

⁶³ Associated Press, “Legislative Briefs: Cosmetic Surgery,” (Alexandria, LA) Town Talk, May 28, 1989

⁶⁴ Izzy Schifano, “What Is the 'Criminal' Plastic Surgery in the *Tinder Swindler* and Is It Real?,” *The Tab* (Tab Media Ltd., February 8, 2022), <https://thetab.com/uk/2022/02/08/what-is-the-criminal-face-plastic-surgery-in-the-tinder-swindler-and-is-it-real-netflix-simon-leviev-239409>.

⁶⁵ “Prison Reform: Reducing Recidivism by Strengthening the Federal Bureau of Prisons,” The United States Department of Justice (U.S. Department of Justice, March 6, 2017), <https://www.justice.gov/archives/prison-reform>.

and “cosmetic” do not appear anywhere. In 2005, California Department of Corrections was renamed California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, emphasizing the priority of inmate treatment and recovery.

Looking to the future, original rehabilitative methods are needed now more than ever to decrease the number of those incarcerated and lower recidivism. For example, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons claims mental health treatment is a priority. However, 1,200 inmates identify as transgender, the majority of whom struggle with gender dysphoria and the mental health conditions that come with it. These worlds have collided in headlines during recent years as transgender inmates seek gender confirmation surgery while incarcerated. Texas inmate Cristina Iglesias has been requesting surgery since 2016. At the beginning of 2022, a federal judge ordered the U.S. Bureau of Prisons to evaluate Iglesias. The request calls into question the future duties of the state and federal government in truly seeking to rehabilitate inmates while they serve time behind bars.⁶⁶

As the medical community continues to research such matters, the U.S. Bureau of Prisons will have to acknowledge and participate in evolving discussions regarding gender confirmation and the status of their transgender population. Prison administrators must also consider how advancements in medicine, therapy, and treatment can be applied to inmates. For example, scientists at the University of Chicago have developed a genetically modified skin graft that releases a dopamine regulating molecule to combat cocaine and alcohol addictions.⁶⁷ Though currently not being tested in a human trial, the research represents innovative scientific processes that can curb a growing prison population.

⁶⁶ Carlie Porterfield, “Trans Woman Could Be First Federal Inmate to Undergo Gender Confirmation Surgery,” *Forbes* (Forbes Magazine, January 5, 2022), <https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlieporterfield/2022/01/04/trans-woman-could-be-first-federal-inmate-to-undergo-gender-confirmation-surgery/>.

⁶⁷ John Keilman. "Genetically Altered Skin Grafts Hold Promise as Addiction Treatment, University of Chicago Scientists Say." Tribune Publishing Company, LLC.

Historically, plastic surgery in prison populations raised concern over criminal anonymity, economic anxiety on how state funds were being spent, praise for generosity shown by medical professionals, and at times blurred the line between rehabilitation and experimentation. Though these programs stopped, they represented genuine efforts at what prisons are supposed to embody: rehabilitation. Their historical context can teach us about listening to inmates, the power of appearance, and the futile quest for perfection.